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1CHAPTER I
PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY TODAY: THE STATE OF THE FIELD
Not long ago when I sat as a graduate students' rep-
resentative to the psychology department's executive
committee I was impressed by a faculty member's remark
about upgrading the requirements of our undergraduate
majors. More "rigor" was in order to produce first-rate
candidates for graduate study and professional careers,
he made clear. "We should require more courses in other
fields related to psychology? they should take more physics,
more chemistry, more calculus." In the discussion that
followed no one mentioned more sociology, philosophy, or
literature courses. No vote was taken, but I left the
meeting vaguely dissatisfied.
The suspicion that my personal conception of psych-
ology was not universally upheld in the field was
heightened not long afterwards over lunch with a researcher
whose specialty involved implanting brain lesions in mice.
"Oh, come on," she said with impatience, "nobody does
psychology anymore. Psychology is dead." Her point, if
I understood her, was to differentiate psychology from
behavioral science. Concerned as it was with "unscientific"
notions about mental life, psychology was obsolete; anything
worth salvaging could be incorporated into the broadening
field of neuroscience
.
What psychologists say over lunch is not always
implemented back at the office, so it is worth noting that
at the department where she now teaches—and among her
classes is the introductory course--she recently recommended
that no one be hired to replace the single personality-
clinical psychologist who had left. He had taught the
theories of personality course.
These examples, which can be multiplied, suggest at
least superficially that contemporary American academic
psychology has excluded from its rigorous examination most
of what the non-specialist imagines psychologists know
and think about. Instructors of introductory psychology
courses are familiar with the gap between students* anti-
cipations, their hopes of understanding themselves and
resolving, finally, the puzzle of human nature, and the
contents of academic psychology, replete with normal curves,
Nodes of Ranvier, Lashley jumping stands, fixed-ratio
reinforcement schedules, and so on. It is easy, too, to
understand the blank reactions of lay readers who devour
with interest books like Passages , Denial of Death , The
Politics of Experience , and Becoming Partners when con-
fronted with the table of contents of such professional
publications as The Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, Consider the first paragraph from a paper with
an uncommonly promising title, "Toward a Causal Model of Lov
3by Tesser and Paulhus (1976):
Some recent work demonstrates that thought
about some person, thing, or idea increases
the likelihood that one's attitude will polar-
ize (e.g., Sadler & Tesser, 1973; Tesser^&
Conlee, 1975). Perhaps this effect occurs
because thought alters one's salient cognitions,
making them more consistent with the initial
attitude. Since affect is related to cognitions,
thought polarizes attitudes. Given that persons
like those they date, thinking will lead to the
generation of favorable attributes (Tesser &
Cowan,
^
in press). Thus, the more thought about
a previous date, the greater the resulting love
for that date. Reciprocally, we assume that
extremity of feeling about some object increases
the likelihood of its being thought about. In
the present context, then, thought about a date
should be a positive function of one's love for
that date.
P. 1095
But if laymen draw a blank at such prose, academic
psychologists are rarely chagrined, needing only to remind
themselves of the lay public's naivete about scientific
psychology. And there is some reason to this view, for
psychology is not obligated by the preconceptions or
needs of non-specialists.
Among personality psychologists, though, there is
another, additional reaction, and that is to lay the chief
ills upon the shoulders of research psychologists in the
other specialties, especially the behaviorists . It is they
whose reductionism trivializes and dehumanizes psychology.
Personality psychologists—and I have counted myself one
for seven years—probably derive a sense of professional
solidarity and group identification simply out of our shared
sense of being unlike them, those behaviorists. Because we
utilize a class of variables eschewed by our rat-running
colleagues, our "inner," personality variables, we see our-
selves somewhat as champions of freedom and dignity.
But the crisis of relevance in psychology cannot com-
placently be laid on the behaviorist doorstep and simply
forgotten, while we pursue personality research, for per-
sonality psychology itself is open to claims of triviality,
irrelevance--of turning its back upon its proper subject
matter. Students in introductory courses in personality
are not immune from feeling, several weeks into the course,
that they have mistaken their room assignments and have
accidentally sat in on some other course. I have encountered
students who, having survived the introductory psychology
course with some interest intact and expecting to get to
the heart of the matter with personality studies, react
with the same blank shock to the research work published
in the Journal of Personality
. What do such neophytes,
interested in what it means to be a person, make of such
titles as these, the lead articles from the four issues of
that journal's forty-fourth volume:
The Verbal Communication of Inconsistency
Between Attitudes Held and Attitudes
Expressed (Wagner and Pease, 1976)
Measurement and Generality of Response
Dispositions in Person Perception
(Kaplan, 1976)
Status Inconsistency, Aggressive Attitude,
and Helping Behavior (Midlarsky and Mid-
larsky, 1976)
5Expressive Control and the Leakage of
Dispositional Introversion-Extraversion
During Role-Playing Teaching (Lippa, 1976).
Speaking of the ills of his own field, the eminent socio-
logist Peter Berger (I963) writes:
It remains true... that a goodly part of the
sociological enterprise in this country con-
tinues to consist of little studies of
obscure fragments of social life, irrelevant
to any broader theoretical concern. One glance
at the table of contents of the major socio-
logical journals or at the list of papers read
at sociological conventions will confirm this
statement
.
P. 9
Might not the same comment be made concerning personality
psychology today?
But if contemporary academic personality psychology is
undergoing a crisis of relevance, the fact will not suc-
cessfully be proven to today's researchers simply on the
basis of laymen's and students' shocked reactions. Yet
indications exist within the field itself.
When I began graduate study I was invited to accom-
pany a professor of personality to address an assembly of
undergraduates interested in psychology careers. When asked
to explain exactly what personality psychology was aboux,
he replied in terms which at the time surprised me. Per-
sonality, he began, contains so many different topics that
it is difficult to see how to define it at all. It is
really a miscellany, he continued; if you do not fit
anywhere else in psychology, you probably belong in
personality.
Sitting there listening, I thought he had misspoken.
Anyone with even a sketchy knowledge of the field should
know that personality psychology was that branch of psych-
ology which took the person as a whole as its major unit
of analysis, whose emphases included understanding normal
functioning as well as development, and whose overall
scientific goal was an adequate conceptualization of per-
sonhood. Surely any of the classical personality psych-
ologists, say, Allport or Murray, would have replied in such
terms as these.
Three years have now passed, and I have revised my view
considerably on the basis of my greater familiarity with the
field. The professor was correct in describing it as a
hodge podge of unrelated researches, unalloyed by much of an
integrating theoretical umbrella: a miscellany, if you will.
The transformation from the classical conception of the
field into the contemporary description suggests something
drastic has taken place, that something certainly has gone
awry
.
My experiences as a teaching assistant to professors
giving personality courses at three colleges have contrib-
uted to my own sense of crisis. The contrast between two
of these courses, which ran during the same semester, struck
me forcibly. In one the professor began his lectures by
stating that while personality courses in the oast have
typically presented a series of personality theories, his
own course would not discuss them "because research has
proven them to be inaccurate representations of human
beings." The other course, taught by a practicing clinical
psychologist, not a personality psychologist, devoted
most of its lectures to the presentation of a series of
personality theories, dynamic, phenomenological, trait-
oriented, and so on, the professor. drawing frequently upon
his clinical experiences to illustrate how well some of the
theories promote an understanding of persons.
That a professor of personality can without qualms
delete significant discussion of personality theorists
from his lectures in 1977 is really not so extraordinary,
given other trends within the field. While some recent text
such as the second edition of Hall and Lindzey's Theories
of Personality (1970) are almost, entirely devoted to the
discussion of personality theories, today's trend is toward
greater emphasis upon research and techniques. Mischel's
(1971) text Introduction to Personality serves as one
example.
The prestigious Jou. .:al of Personality published
during the year 1976 forty articles, containing 305 ref-
erences. Of these 805, only 35 are to what liberally might
be considered theoretical sources. Of these 35 references,
77^_-twenty-seven citations—are to three theorists alone:
Rotter (13), Kohlberg (9), and Piaget (5). Freud is citad
in one paper only, and no references are made at all to
8the theoretical writings of Allport, Erikson, Kelly,
Maslow, or Murray, to list some of the most obvious
omissions
.
No one will argue with the assertion that the role of
general theory in contemporary academic personality psych-
ology has dwindled, but plenty of room for disagreement
exists over the significance of the loss. The case can be
made that the loss is symptomatic of the field's growing
irrelevance to any understanding of personhood, in the
sense of some human nature. The seemingly outmoded theories
have tended to depict the person as an indivisible unit
of analysis, as multifaceted and complex, yet organized.
The loss of theory has gone hand in hand with the increase
in research employing one or a handful of personality
variables, research in personality fragments which add up nei-
ther to a theory of personality nor to persons themselves.
Do general theories of personality contribute to the
understanding of persons? A partial answer is suggested by
the experience of graduate students in a seminar involving
its participants in interviews with undergraduate subjects.
The idea behind this seminar, of allowing personality grad-
uate students to conduct research consisting chiefly in
confronting another human being as such, met with some
1
I do not mean to say that all personality theories
are inherently holistic or non-reductionistic ; however
reductionistic some maybe (e.g., Cattell's theory), they
focus on the overall organization or personality and
provide a sense of personhood.
9initial resistance on the part of the personality area, and
seminar members were required to include a formidable bat-
tery of psychometric devices to insure objectivity and
scientific rigor. For many of the participants, this exper-
ience was their first in interviewing.
What happened? While all of the graduate students were
aware of the mechanical ease of doing questionnaire or
simple experimental research, and of producing the kinds
of studies that fill current journals, the 'unusual exper-
ience of being confronted with human beings in their own
terms forced us back time after time to the very terminol-
ogies that "research has proven... to be inaccurate rep-
resentations of human beings." The frame of mind embodied
by much current research, oriented as it is toward the
quantification of discrete personality variables, proved
unsatisfying in the face of the complexity of nuance we
encountered in our subjects* lives, and to the surprise of
some we frequently employed loosely-psychoanalytic dynamic
theory to arrive at some significant understanding.
The discrepancy between the conceptualisations sug-
gested by the rare exposure to interviewing research and
the conceptualizations that arise from the vastly more
typical paper-and-pencil or experimental designs was hard
to miss; it suggests much about the effect of virtually
banishing general theories from contemporary personality
psychology.
10
In the last few pages I have argued the case that the
dwindling influence of general theories has contributed to
the crisis of irrelevance in personality psychology today,
but what remains to be shown is that the kind of research
and conceptualizing that has taken its place is itself
unsatisfactory. But what might constitute sufficient proof
is not clear to me.
On one hand, contemporary work in personality psych-
ology has led to fruitful applications. Employee selection
in industry and government has benefitted both from the
personality tests and general psychometric expertise of
personality psychologists. The Massachusetts Civil Service,
for example, has employed to my knowledge both Cattell's
16 Personal Factors Inventory and the California Psycholog-
ical Inventory to select police and fire-fighter person-
nel. I have recently heard that the General Motors corpor-
ation is seeking psychologists to aid in the identification
and selection of, presumably, more productive workers.
On the other hand, as I have suggested, the great pop-
ularity of bookstore psychology, rarely the product of the
academic psychological community, in contrast to the
virtual immunity of lay readers to the publications sanct-
ioned by the American Psychological Association, is testi-
mony to how little we have addressed ourselves to the
needs
of the common man in his efforts toward self-understanding
and adjustment. For the most part, the fruits of academic
11
personality psychology in recent years have been largely
irrelevant to the concerns of the proverbial man on the
street
.
But there is restiveness, too, away from the street;
restiveness in the offices of some personality researchers.
On several occasions professors have privately confided
their opinions that for the most part the contents of the
journals are "trivial," and "not worth reading." Once when
I proposed an independent study consisting of catching up
on some of the recent journal issues, I was advised that
such an effort would be "a waste of time." And once a
professor who had taught personality at Harvard, in refer-
ence to current research conventions, quipped that "most
psychologists couldn't verify the existence of their noses."
Not all the criticisms are privately expressed. A
number of writers, both within psychology and within
academia in general, have levied the charge of triviality
and irrelevance against contemporary psychology. Peter
Berger (1963), whose critical examination of sociology
is itself richly suggestive of problems within psychology,
identifies psychologists' historical concern with their
status as scientists as a cause of trivial findings:
At the same time it is quite true that some
sociologists, especially in America, have be-
come so preoccupied with methodological
questions that they have ceased to be inter-
ested in society at all. As a result, they
have found nothing of significance about any
12
aspect of social life, since in science as in
love a concentration on technique is quite likely
to lead to impotence. Much of this fixation on
methodology can be explained in terms of the urge
of a relatively new discipline to find accept-
ance on the academic scene. Since science is an
almost sacred entity among Americans in general
and American academecians in particular, the
desire to emulate the procedures of the older
natural sciences is very strong among the new-
comers in the marketplace of erudition. Giving
in to this desire, the experimental psycholo-
gists, for instance, have succeeded to such an
extent that their studies have commonly nothing
more to do with anything that human "beings are
or do. The irony of this process lies in the
fact that natural scientists themselves have been
giving up the very positivistic dogmatism that
their emulators are still straining to adopt.
P. 13
Although I disagree with the implication that there
is any single process that can be labelled science, at
least to the extent of wishing to suggest that the problem
may not be that psychologists are too scientific so much
as they give their allegiance to an ill-fitting conception
of science, the relation Berger points out, that between
psychology's "fixation on methodology" and its putative
irrelevance, is certainly crucial, and will be discussed
in subsequent chapters. The insight is reiterated in
these remarks of Noam Chomsky (1965):
One may ask whether the necessity for
present day linguistics to give such prior-
ity to introspective evidence and to the
linguistic intuition of the native speaker
excludes it from the domain of science. The
answer to this seemingly terminological
question seems to have no bearing at all on
any serious issue. At most, it determines how
we shall denote the kind of m research that can
be effectively carried out in the present
state
of our technique and understanding. However,
13
this terminological question actually does
relate to a different issue of some interest,
namely the question whether the important
feature of the successful sciences has been
their search for insight or their concern for
objectivity. The social and behavioral sciences
provide ample evidence that objectivity can be
pursued with little consequent gain in insight
and understanding. On the other hand, a good
case can be made for the view that the natural
sciences have, by and large, sought objectivity
primarily insofar as it is a tool for gaining
insight (for providing phenomena that can sug-
gest or test deeper explanatory hypotheses).
p. 20
Noteworthy in Chomsky's statement is the implication
that it is possible to define and then conduct science in
such a way that one's ultimate results lack "insight and
understanding," however "objective" the procedures may
seem. That this is the case in contemporary psychology will
be argued in subsequent discussion. A second implication
that anticipates later discussion concerns the distinction
between determining one's investigative procedures by the
"demands" of one's subject matter and determining them to
conform to an externally imposed recipe purporting to be
scientific
.
Criticisms of psychology are not restricted to
scholars from neighboring fields. The British psychol-
ogist Liam Hudson (1973) notes:
The discipline's health is suspect: as
Zangwill remarked, it has failed to produce
a coherent body of scientific law; and its
fruits, unmistakably, have about them an air
of triviality. Attempts to justify psycholog-
ical research in terms of social utility at
present lead inexorably to bathos. There is
14
little we have produced in the last fifty years
that is, in any sense of that complex word,
'relevant*
. .
.
p. Ill
Speaking more directly of the field of personality, James
Deese (1972) echoes Chomsky and Berger's charge identifying
psychological research methods as the source of the
problem
:
One reason so much current empirical research
is trivial and pointless is that the experi-
mental method is inapplicable to many problems
in social psychology and the psychology of
personality.
p. 24
Deese believes that "much of the fundamental study of pers-
onality within the framework of the traditional scientific
view is empirical and relatively shallow" (p. 92).
To this small collection of critical statements in
reference to the standard research of academic psychology
in general and of personality psychology in particular,
many more could be added. One thinks of Rae Carlson's (1971)
paper, "Where is the Person in Personality Research?," a
critique which in its essentials scarcely differs from
those Allport consistently makes in his reviews of the
field (cf., 1961).
Yet the very fact that such journals as Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology and the Journal of Per-
sonality continue to be avalanched by the papers of eager
researchers suggests that many psychologists to this day
15
consider research conducted along present lines worth
doing. 2 Certainly in our field it may be said that he who
publisheth, surviveth; but, beyond that, there are those
who have no complaints about the field today. How can the
diversity of reactions to the state of research be ex-
plained? How can we understand the complaints of some and
the complacency of others?
Although contemporary personality psychologists part-
icipate in the same field, their perceptions vary accord-
ing to their own positions within it. Some researchers have
made a greater commitment of both time and selves and have,
one may suppose, a greater stake in upholding current
practices. Some may have had experiences that were especi-
ally disillusioning. The judgement one arrives at regarding
the importance, worth, and relevance of contemporary
psychological research is likely, in the end, to be a funct-
ion of one's experiences and position in the field.
My own judgements, of course, are subject to the same
kind of influence. I, too, survey the field from a vantage
point that represents my own personal coordinates of
experience and position. Some statement pinpointing these
Submission of research manuscripts need not in itself
indicate much enthusiasm for the kinds of research currently
undertaken. As long as hiring and promotion decisions
reflect amount of publications, career-minded scholars are
compelled to comply with editorial policy. Moreover, some
graduate departments maintain the conservative tradition
of insisting upon quantitative, empirical research projects
for degree candidates.
16
is in order. Speaking of the "significant learnings" of
his lifetime as a psychotherapist, Carl Rogers (1961)
includes the statement, "What is most personal is most
general" (p. 26); I am increasingly confident that my own
perceptions are neither idiosyncratic nor unique, but
perhaps somewhat common.
In retrospect I can see that my socialization within
the field had encouraged the formulation of a construct
system (cf., Kelly, 1955) that could not adequately accomo-
date my genuine experience as a human being. The concepts
and language I had painstakingly mastered in the ten or so
years since I undertook the formal study of psychology
had left me increasingly estranged from myself. The
acquired experiential categories were alien to the actual
experiences of being, for lack of better terms, "fully
human." Being by nature serious about my work, I tried and
to a considerable extent succeeded in squeezing my percept-
ions—of self and others—into the ill-fitting shoe my
socialized conceptualization of personhood demanded.
I had, to overstate the case a bit, quantified my soul
to the point of losing it.
3
3 By laying the chief blame upon the distorting capacity
of psychology's constructs, I neglect the possibility of a
pre-existing "fit" between the personality or emotional needs
of a researcher—perhaps my own, too—and the world view of
academic psychology. Perhaps certain persons are drawn to
the realitv illumined by psychology's constructs? My nuncn
is there are, and research done into this matter would
add to our understanding of the variations in the percept-
ions of crisis in the field, as well as of the prospects
for change.
17
I reached a point where I simultaneously viewed myself
vainly as a reasonably well functioning person in terms of
my scholarly understanding of personality, and as emot-
ionally deadened. It gradually dawned on me that the models
of personhood implicit in current personality formulations,
so amenable to codification and quantification, so readily
processable by complicated and elegant statistical tests,
were incompatible with a deep and rich inner experience.
If the realization I am describing recalls the exper-
ience of the graduate seminar build around the direct inter-
viewing of undergraduate subjects, I would not be surprised
for among the personal experiences which brought me to the
brink of insight was the life-history interviews I con-
ducted of forty-year-old divorced women, under the auspices
of the sociologist Alice S. Rossi.
One of these women, describing the break up of her
marriage, spoke of her trip to Europe with her stock broker
husband. Day-dreaming of travelling together on a vespa,
vagabonding from pension to pension , she found herself
instead shuttling between jet and taxi, taxi and luxurious
hotel. Something inside did not fit; something inside
snapped. She finally told her husband, "I'm leaving you.
I'm going home. I feel I'm living a lie."
The phrase "living a lie" would not leave me. It took
up residence within me, a kind of inner voice that forced
me into a confrontation with my own existence. The inti-
mate contact I made with my subjects' lives, ordinary in
18
some demographic senses, completely more vibrant than my own,
shook me up emotionally and intellectually, and forced upon
me the realization that the conceptual apparatus of academic
psychology encourages one to perceive oneself and others as
if humans really were the two-dimensional superficial creat-
ures psychological formulations suggest. To put the matter
again in extreme terms, I felt myself a zombie who had
caught a glimpse of himself in a mirror.
Teaching personality to undergraduates only augmented
the growing dissatisfaction I felt. In my first lecture
course I did nothing so much as instill in my students a
sequence of new and arcane vocabularies. I provided them
with the new conceptual categories, essential for their
written examinations, yet seeming not to enhance their
genuine understanding of human existence. Teaching certain-
ly provides ample opportunity to observe the socializing
function a discipline requires for currying potential
new members. By insisting to them, as my undergraduate
professors had insisted, that no theoretical statement could
be made unless one could answer the question, "Oh? Where
are the data?," I observed myself passing on a criterion
for verification that was stultifyingly narrow.
Moreover, the inevitable inveighing against the methods
of introspection, a part of my teaching catechism, breeded
an alienation from the lessons of one's own gut. The lesson
that scientific proof can never obtain from any inner,
19
intuitive corroboration conveyed the message that inner
intuitions themselves are not part of the true scientist's
equipage. As a result, part of the socialization of my
students consisted of breaking the link between one's inner
experience--one's subjective reality--and one's cognitive
formulations. Such a severance, I can see now, had been
singularly well accomplished in my own case.
In his criticism of the field, Hudson (1973) states:
Just as novelists draw on their experiences,
so too do psychologists. We would both be cut
off, otherwise, from the springs of our intel-
lectual vitality. To refuse a psychologist
access to his intuitions, even if this were
possible, would be as stultifying and as
short-sighted as it would be to deny them to
a physicist or a painter.
P. 129
I sadly must conclude that we are able to make more progress
in reducing access to our intuitions than Hudson believes
is possible. Perhaps more than anything, it is the typical
confusion between the context of discovery and the context
of justification in science (cf., Rudner, 1966) that promotes
in the bidding student the mistrust of and alienation from
his intuitive experience, for psychologists seek to restrict
the title of science to that portion of the scientific
spectrum especially appropriate to hypothesis testing.
The message conveyed reads something like this : only
when an observation can be externally validated through
appropriate quantitative procedures can one be said to have
made an observation at all; thus, it follows that the good
20
scientist will restrict his perceptions to only such kinds
of observations.
Such a message is akin to another which, though some-
what oversimplified, can be put as follows: only those
qualities of human existence that are quantifiable ought,
for the good scientist, even be visible.
In my second personality course I aimed at meeting the
demand's for relevance that students bring to such courses.
The task of translating tack into English the real fruits
of our discipline's researches proved challenging and
difficult. I used a theories textbook, but augmented it
with such outside reading as Rogers's Becoming Partners,
Freud's Dora: An Analysis of a Case of Hysteria , and
Castaneda's Tales of Power. The research journals were of
no use. The best, most enlivening and insightful discussions
grew out of the readings that reached and drew out students*
personal experiences, the readings which did not imply, as
so much of the psychological literature does, that one's
inner life is no more real than doppelgangers or leprechauns.
The combined result of my interviewing studies, my
undergraduate teaching, a good, critical history of
psychology course, and other crises in my personal life
brought me to reassess the field of academic psychology,
as well as my relation to it. I drew back from many
intellectual commitments and for the first time in years
was able to attend to the long-mute inner voices.
21
As part of this process of drawing back, I taught for
a year a course in freshman rhetoric. It is possible, I was
reminded, to deal intelligibly with ideas that are not
verified solely in terms of their fidelity to empirical
proofs, suggesting that psychology's criterion of knowin g,-
is neither divine nor universal. Rather, it represents an
epistemological position which itself can. profitably be
put under scrutiny. The content of our concepts reflects
many assumptions and presuppositions about what it means
to know, and I believe now that there is a crisis in per-
sonality psychology, one that can be related directly to
these assumptions and presuppositions.
Certain crucial questions have suggested themselves,
perhaps the foremost of which concerns the nature of
science itself. The psychology textbooks I have seen have
in no way contradicted the implicit lesson of my own educ-
ation, that there is such a thing as a fixed, universal
scientific process. Is this really so? It seems to me now
that the charge of irrelevance cannot be made without
reference to the methodological commitments of psychologists
who place their trust in the scientific method they have
been socialized to take for granted. As noted, many critics
have leveled the charge that personality psychology's troubles
begin with its method-centric ity. Gadlin and Ingle (1975)
put the matter succinctly:
22
We ought to begin with a reversal of the pre-
sent empases: Psychology should initially addressitself to phenomena, not methodology. Rather
than selecting for research those phenomena
suited to our methods, we ought to shape and
develop our methods to fit phenomena.
p. 1007
I concur. Psychology suffers from an inadequate understanding
of the scientific process, and the procedures we employ have
untoward consequences both for the import of our research
and for our conceptions of ourselves and others as persons.
The closest formulation of the problem in my view is
embodied in the anti-positivist philosopher of science
Thomas Kuhn's (1970a) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
.
Kuhn's concept of paradigm provides a convenient handle for
the diagnosis of present day personality psychology.
To anticipate the argument of the next chapters, the
assumptions and presuppositions that constitute personality
psychology's present understanding of science and of method
can be described as a paradigm, and this paradigm is not
something fixed and universal, but, rather, arbitrary and
debatable. It is my thesis that the paradigm of contemporary
psychology, shared by personality psychologists, is essent-
ially behaviorist and not especially appropriate for the
study of personality, especially as personality was under-
stood when the field originated. Personality psychology's
history suggests we are in the thrall of a paradigm that
accounts for the crisis we as a field are currently exper-
iencing.
23
CHAPTER II
PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY'S PARADIGM
I have suggested that personality psychology is a
field in crisis and have included the statements of other
writers who clearly agree. But the field as yet has heard
no general outcry that crisis is at hand. Why is it that
the sense of crisis is not more widespread?
One reason is this: today's personality research for
the most part "works." Many researchers keep at bay any
recognition of crisis through the reassurance they find
in adhering to procedures that are unquestionably and gen-
erally regarded as scientific, and in procuring from these
procedures data that provide significant tests of the
hypotheses they conceptualize.
The problem of personality psychology is not that it
cannot test or verify the questions it raises for itself.
The mechanics of hypothesis-testing and verification as
prescribed work well enough. The problem is not a pro-
cedural hitch, not a methodological short-circuit.
The problem in a way is that personality research
is too do-able. That is, today's research procedures, our
legitimate methods, allow researchers to feel they are
'doing the right thing* with their research, and thus
serve as blinders that imprison the researcher in certain
2Ur
conceptualizations of his subject matter while precluding
others. Moreover, I would maintain, the conceptualizations
we are in the thrall of lead to the phrasing of trivial
questions and much irrelevant research.
Personality psychologists, then, have the satisfaction
both of 'doing what they are supposed to do' to be scient-
ifically secure and of obtaining results that are appropriate
to their questions. The crisis, then, is not brought on
because operating by the book leads to inescapable break-
down. It does not. The problem is not within the system. The
system runs. The problem is the system itself.
The problem, I would like to say, is the paradigm
underlying personality research today. The term is taken
from the philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn, whose essay
(1970a) advances the thesis that a science develops not by
the gradual accretion of more and more proven facts, but
rather through a succession of world views, or conceptual
pictures, upon which the actual theoretical work of a
given scientific period— as well as its taken-for-
granted facts--is based. When a scientific community under-
goes a 'revolution,' according to Kuhn, what changes is its
paradigm. This change is like an irreversible gestalt
switch, altering the scientific community's perception of
its subject matter, its appropriate procedures, and itself.
About paradigm revolution Kuhn states
:
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...it is a reconstruction of the field from
new fundamentals, a reconstrcution that changes
some of
_
the field's most elementary theoretical
generalizations as well as many of its paradigm
methods and applications. During the transition
period there will be large but never complete
overlap between the problems that can be solved
by the old and the new paradigm. But there will
also be a decisive difference in the modes of
solution. When the transition is complete, the
profession will have changed its views of the
field, its methods, and its goals.
P. 85
Because I will employ the concept of paradigm in a some-
what crucial role in presenting my argument, I shall try
to clarify what I mean by it and believe Kuhn, himself,
chiefly means by it.^-
In his seminal essay Kuhn employs the concept of
paradigm in several different senses, providing critics
with a foothold for levying attacks over the niceties of
definition, while providing his adherents with a richer
sense of his meaning. Masterman, a friendly critic, in
her essay (1970) "The Nature of a Paradigm" counts 21
senses of the term as employed by Kuhn. She remarks that
"not all these senses of 'paradigm* are inconsistent with
one another: some may even be elucidations of others"
(p. 65). 5 Masterman has distilled these different senses
^The application of Kuhn's analysis of science through-
out this essay is intended more as an optic to enhance
understanding than as any strict test of Kuhn's ideas.
5Masterman notes that charges of obscurity in Kuhn are
typically levied by philosophers, net scientists themselves.
Actual scientists find Kuhn "perspicuous," a circum-
stance Masterman attributes to Kuhn's having "really looked
at actual science, in several fields, instead of confining
his field of reading to that of the history and philosophy
of science" (p. 59).
of the term paradigm into three categories: metaphysical,
sociological, and artefactual.
For a fuller account of these definitional distinct-
ions, the interested reader is referred not only to the
Masterman essay, but also to Kuhn's (1970a) postscript to
his original essay, published eight years earlier. In
this discussion, paradigm refers to the system of pre-
suppositions, frequently tacit, that determine how a
scientific community construes (perceives and interprets)
its very subject matter--and, as a consequence, phrases
its problems in the conceptual fashion it ultimately does.
Kuhn gives vivid enough illustrations of the workings
of a paradigm in this sense. He claims that were Aristotle
and Galileo confronted by, say, a stone hanging on a
string, swinging, they would see two different realities:
Aristotle would see "constrained fall;" Galileo, a pend-
ulum. Similarly, according to Kuhn:
Lavoisier ... saw oxygen where Priestley had
seen dephlogisticated air and where others
had seen nothing at all.
p. 18
Paradigms operate at the implicit level to give rise to
the explicit reality we take for granted.
To describe a paradigm, then, involves making explicit
ideas and preconceptions that are normally taken for
granted. According to an old adage, fish are the last
to discover the existence of water. Personality psychclo-
gists, similarly, may have a difficult time discovering
the implicit paradigm presuppositions that endow our pre-
sent endeavors with their taken-for-granted aura of
scientific respectability and inevitability.
Since the quickest and most reliable aid to the fish's
discovery of water is its removal from it, it follows that
the presuppositions one makes as a personality psychologist
might to a certain extent be made clear by transposing
oneself into a different field. Something of the sort
occurred to me when I became a teacher of rhetoric, a trans-
position out of empirical science altogether.
I was struck first by the willingness of other acad-
emicians seriously to entertain ideas without demanding
quantitative proofs of any kind. An idea, it would seem,
could have cogency independent of anyone's marshalling
numerical evidence to support it. An idea, to put it bluntly,
was not necessarily illegitimate just because it was never
wedded to an operation.
Take, for example, Orwell's essay "Politics and The
English Language." Orwell advances the thesis that corrupt-
ion of language leads to corruption of both thought and
governance, a reasonable idea, certainly, in light of,
say, the Watergate locutions. Orwell argues his position
well, but there is nothing in the process of argument that
approaches what I, as a psychologist, am accustomed to
consider as proof. He gives examples cf misleading,
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treacherous, and ugly usages, but a psychologist would
build his case very differently.
A psychologist would automatically begin to ponder the
measurement of dependent and independent variables. He might
devise a goodness-of-English-usage test, to be administered
as a measure of corruption of language. Possibly the subjects
would be divided according to how willing they are to use
"ain't." A test of high school civics might be adopted as
an index of commitment to decent government. The first step
in the procedure, it should be noted, is to anchor one's
concepts in reality, which in the world—or paradigm— of
psychology is the effect of codification and quantification.
Operationalizing one's concepts, for the psychologist,
realizes them.
The completion of the study whose beginnings I have
sketched above can be left to the enterprising imagination;
the point I want to make is in reference to certain rules
of the game that became clear when I had achieved some
perspective on personality psychology. These rules, it seemed
to me, had a great deal to do with verification, which is to
say method .
^
Striking differences are immediately apparent in the
methods of an English essayist and American psychologists,
Rudner (1966) distinguishes the term method from
technique and procedure, defining method as a discipline's
logic of justification: the rationale by which a discipline
bases its acceptance or rejection of hypotheses or theories.
(See p. 5 )
.
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but paradigm differences occur among the sciences and, as I
hope to show, among the disciplines of psychology.
The student of personality theories has an advantage
in understanding Kuhn's concept of paradigm, for the usage
is anticipated in George Kelly's (1955) personal construct
theory and its philosophical foundation, constructive
alternativism. Kelly explained personality itself as the
process of sensibly construing the world, and he assumed
the world is open to potentially infinite numbers of
different interpretations, many of which being completely
capable of yielding a fair share of accurate empirical
predictions. 3y extending the individual notion of cons-
truct system onto a scientific community, we arrive at Kuhn's
conception of paradigm (indeed, Kelly liked to draw the
analogy in reverse: his snapshot description of human
nature is "Man the scientist.").
When an individual's construct system is transformed,
his reality changes. We can understand Kuhn's description
of scientific revolution as a catyclysmic shift in the
underlying construct system not of an individual alone,
but of a community of scientists, of an entire discipline.
"After a revolution," writes Kuhn (p. Ill), "scientists
are responding to a different world."
The idea of scientists responding to a different world
has been illustrated by Kuhn with examples from physics and
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chemistry: Aristotle and Galileo, Lavoisier and Priestley.
But we can add one, at least hypothetioally
, from psychology.
Let us imagine in the presence of two of psychology's most
famous mythological beasts— the radical behaviorist and
the tender-minded humanist—an infant who, in lay terms,
is crying its eyes cut. Would our two psychologists, rep-
resenting such diverse perspectives?, see the same thing?
The behaviorist, one can reasonably assume, might
report "a human organism emitting an operant in obeyance
with its reinforcement history," while the humanist might
describe "a human being in its formative years reacting
with displeasure and pain to some unfulfilled need."
That they are seeing two different realities might be
made clear by their answers to such questions as, "What,
if anything is wrong here?," and "What might a solution be?"
The behaviorist might conclude that the operant
emitted is undesirable and should no longer be reinforced.
His solution might be not to attend the organism (e.g.,
provide positive reinforcement) while it continued to cry.
The humanist might define the problem in terms of the threat
to the baby's sense of trust in the world and confidence
in its own efficacy. The humanist, interpreting the crying
^The term "perspective" is employed here rather than
"paradigm" to avoid confusion with the application of the
latter concept to psychology throughout this thesis. It is
certainly arguable that paradigm differences divide
behavior ists and humanists, however.
as a meaningful communication, might recommend fulfilling
the unmet need. Doing so would engender a sense of both
trust and agency, the ideal 'solution.'
The same reality? Clearly not. The humanist, one can
assume, would regard the behaviorist ' s recommendation as
a formula for crippling the child psychologically, while
the humanist's solution would seem a matter of coddling
to invisible demons to the behaviorist. Worse, it would
unintentionally reinforce the very problem one hoped to
extinguish
.
Both of these hypothetical psychologists are responding
to different conceptual formulations and, more, to different
realities. Is one right and the other wrong? The question-
is certainly complicated. Each perspective—and the argu-
ment holds generally for paradigms— tends to justify itself
and be justified in its own terms, while failing completely
in the terms of another.
The behaviorist might, should he be granted the oppor-
tunity for a test, succeed completely in extinguishing the
undesired operant. The removal of the crying and wailing
behavior— at once obvious to any and all--is empirically
sufficient in the behaviorist view to lend support to the
entire behaviorist system. In his terms he is clearly
•right.'
And the humanist, too, given the opportunity, might
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succeed, completely in raising from that infant an adult
with a sense of both trust and agency. The conscious and
perhaps subconscious indications of trust and agency,
obvious to the perceptive, insightful observer—but perhaps
invisible to the perceptive, insightful behaviorist—are
sufficient to support the humanist system. In his terms he,
too, is clearly 'right.' What is really going on depends
in the end upon the perspective—hence, the paradigm or
reality—from which one views the situation. Even basic
'facts' are paradigm dependent.
How might the paradigm of personality psychology today
be sketched? My experience as a rhetoric teacher suggested
that we take for granted that what is real is what is
measurable. If we can measure something, it exists; if
something cannot.be measured, its existence is much lsss
certain. It is paradigmatic that what is confirmably
observable is scientifically real. Here we might detect
the influence of Watson's early behaviorism: no invisible
mental demons for the science of psychology, and that
includes personality psychology.
The mention of John E, Watson in the context of
personality psychology might strike an anachronistic note
for personality psychologists, but I shall argue the case
that it is not. Indeed, I shall argue that the paradigm of
contemporary academic personality psychology is essentially
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behavior ist, and that it originated in the Watsonian
behaviorism of the early 1900* s, although it did not
become the paradigm of personality psychology for another
30 or so years.
Am I going too far in asserting that personality
psychology's paradigm is essentially behavior ist? I
think not, even though I am aware of how greatly our
explicit explanatory formulations differ from those of
today's behaviorists
.
To approach the behavior ist heart of personality
psychology's current paradigm, let us consider oar methodo-
logical stance. What, for the personality psychologist,
constitutes verification or proof? A first approximation
to an answer is this: empirical demonstration. Empirical
demonstration, we are proud to note, delineates science
from whatever it is the novelist—and Orwell would be
included here— does.
But to say "empirical demonstration" is not enough,
for on close inspection the concept of a single, unitary
process that we can identify as empirical demonstration
proves untenable. Empirical demonstration can refer to
different, perhaps even conflicting, processes in
different paradigms. The introspectionists , as Horace
Eidwell English (1921) of We liesley College makes clear
in his "In Aid of Introspection," considered themselves
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as empirically scientific as the smuggest behaviorist of
today
:
m
Introspection is neither an esoteric art
which can be practiced only by the initiated,
nor an instinct placed by Nature in the breasts
of all in order that the study of psychology
might be possible. It is a scientific method.
p. ^-0^
The introspectionists regarded their technique as nothing
less than the direct observation of their subject matter,
and so it was in the light of their paradigm. In the
light of the behavior is t paradigm, though, they may have
made no scientifically acceptable observations at all.
Empirical demonstration for today's psychologist, and
this includes the personality psychologist, essentially
means the prediction and control of behavior. In terms of
what psychological researchers do, much can be understood
if one grasps the verificatory role accorded to the predict
ion and control of behavior. Because behavior is accorded
such a central role in the field's method, calling the para
digm behaviorist seems reasonable.
As I hope to show in later chapters, personality
psychology did not originally subscribe to the behaviorist
paradigm. The adoption of the behaviorist paradigm has
inverted the discipline's relationship to behavior. Be-
fore the adoption of the behaviorist paradigm, personality
psychologists had as their explanatory goal the scientific
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account of human nature and of individuality, and behav-
ior was methodologically important only to the extent it
provided insights into what needed explanation (the
structure and organization of personality). Today we
have a different relationship to behavior. Like other
psychologists, we are led by our methodological assumptions
into the quest of predicting it. What differentiates us
from other psychologists is our willingness to entertain
the idea of, and employ, personali ty variables to better
predict and control. Instead of being useful if and when
it provided insight into personality, behavior has
become an explanatory goal in itself. Now personality
variables are useful if and when they enable the prediction
and control of behavior.
Today's psychologists take for granted the epistemo-
logical sanctity of predicting and controlling behavior,
and to get them even to entertain questioning the process
for its cargo of presuppositions is hard. In the case of
personality psychology, a question rarely asked--or
actually posable in terms of the paradigm--is this: What
does behavior have to do with personality? Given that the
reality of personality variables is intimately bound up with
their usefulness in predicting and controlling behavior—
or, at least, with their capacity for being even indirectly
measured in terms of some observable behavior--the question
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seems crucial. Standing apart from today's paradigm, one
could reasonably suggest on a priori grounds that behav-
ior is at best only tangentially related to personality.
Personality is both inner and mental, while behavior is
external and social, evidently subject to many influences
other than personality. Not every act—nor for that matter
most acts—are especially expressive of personality.
But in terms of today's paradigm a pareilel between
personality and behavior is taken for granted, and the
subject matter of personality in a very real sense is
forced to be that-which-allows-the-prediction-and-control-
of-behavior. Thus, the dis juncture between behavior and
personality creates vexing problems for today's personality
psychologists
.
Their predicament is illustrated by the controversy
that grew out of Mischel's (1968) Personality and Asse ss-
ment , which suggested strongly—and in the "best tradition"
of quantified examples—that personality variables were
for the most part incapable even of reliability, the simplest
form of prediction. The Mischel controversy involved a
threat to the field, for the alledged inability of person-
ality variables to predict behavior in the face of the
ability to predict on the basis of situation was inter-
preted as an attack on the reality of personality variables.
Personality psychologists were placed in the defensive
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role of trying to establish that personality variables
do exist--that is, can predict successfully.
Prom outside the perspective of the paradigm assumpt-
ions about behavior, the entire 'Mischel controversy'
suggests an entirely different meaning. If, as the evidence
seems to suggest, the regularities of behavior so often
emanate from external, situational influences, then it
follows that the prediction and control of behavior is
not especially useful as a criterion for establishing
the legitimacy of personality variables. Putting the point
in slightly different terms, to predict behavior is not to
explain personality. The entire 'Mischel controversy'
depends on our paradigm assumptions regarding behavior.
In addition to the epistemological role accorded to
the prediction of behavior, today's paradigm is heavily
quantitative. Our quantitative assumptions can be made
explicit by encountering a treatment of personality that
fails to exemplify them. Consider this statement from
Sheehy's (1977) Passages :
It's plausible, though it can't be proven,
that the mastery of one set of tasks fort-
ifies us for the next period and the next set of
challenges. But it's important not to think too
mechanistically. Machines work by units. The
bureaucracy (supposedly) works step by step.
Human beings, thank God, have an individual
inner dynamic that can never be precisely
coded
.
PP. 36-37
Practicing research psychologists may not necessarily
disagree in principle with the statement that individuals
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can never be precisely coded, but their research certainly
presupposes the codif lability of personality processes.
What marks Sheehy's sentiments as especially non-paradig-
matic is her obvious approval of the state of affairs
in which simple mechanistic formulations will not do
("thank God "4 )
,
Today's paradigm assumes a world in which all the
important data are quantifiable, and in which the elements
will behave in some lawlike, determined, and knowable
fashion. The assumption regarding codability is typically
corrupted, though, from the position that all the important
data can be quantified to the view that only the data that
can be quantified are important— and even real.
This emphasis upon codification and quantification
probably derives from the early behaviorists ' understanding
of science, stressing as it did the idea that theoretical
statements are scientific only when securely anchored in
what is observable. Stated somewhat more clearly, psycholo-
gists take the measurable for the existent.
Observable evidence— "hard data"— is important in our
paradigm. The superficial history imparted by introductory
textbooks suggests that by the 1920' s American psychology
threw overboard its dreamy mentalism and, taking its cues
from physics, demanded more rigor by becoming empirical.
But it is an open question whether the empirical procedures
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favored by the behaviorist paradigm actually constitute a
scientific method deserving of the additional adjectives
one and only
. What exactly is the relationship among the
measurable, the real, and the methods we call scientific?
A number of writers within the social sciences have
commented on this point, or close to it. Apparently
assuming the view that the present procedures of the
social sciences constitute the scientific method, sociolo-
gist Berger (1963) concludes that not all of reality is
scientifically treatable:
Nothing is farther from the intentions of
this writer to come out now with a statement
of allegiance to that positivistic creed, still
fashionable among some American social scientists
that believes in only those fragments of reality
that can be dealt with scientifically. Such
positivism results almost invariably in one form
or another of intellectual barbarism, as has
been demonstrated admirably in the recent
history of behavioristic psychology in this
country.
P. 12/*-
I agree with Berger that by taking as real only that
formulation of reality 'visible* to our current methods
we necessarily become intellectually barbarian, or at least
barren; but I disagree with the implication that one
must go beyond science itself to evolve beyond the intel-
lectual stone ages. According to Berger, "only an intellect
ual barbarian is likely to maintain that reality is only
that which car. be grasped by scientific methods" (p. 1^1).
Perhaps the problem is not the narrowness of science, but
rather the narrow interpretation of it to which we now
subscribe
.
Deese (1972) contends that our present blinders are
the result of having adopted as our conception of science
the model of late nineteenth century physics:
Less valuable has been the blind transfer
of
_ the conceptual apparatus of the physical
sciences to psychology as a whole. This whole-
sale transfer is evident in innumerable ways--in certain kinds of psychological theories(which are usually stated in analytic math-
ematical form), in reliance upon statistical
inference, in the preeminence of the notion
of experiment, and in the common use of terms
like "independent and dependent variable" to
describe the form of scientific exploration
in psychology. Of course the commitment goes
deeper than these superficial characteristics.
A very significant proportion of those
psychologists who are leaders in scientific
research follow, in some instances almost
blindly, a theory of scientific method that
represents a philosophic formalization of the
methods of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century physics. Many of these psychologists
believe that the development of the main
outlines of scientific method stopped in the
second quarter of the twentieth century.
?. 3
The old-fashioned philosophical formulations Deese refers
to include both operationalism and positivism. (Positivism,
it should be notes, runs through today's paradigm like
water in quicksand, promoting the acceptance of today's
methods and conceptions because of their firm basis in
empirical support, mindless of the ease with which other
methods and other conceptualizations could, even where
totally contradictory, similarly generate empirical
support.
)
Evident in Deese's statement is the assertion that
other conceptions of scientific method are possible. Not
only are they possible, they have already existed. Kuhn
has suggested that we be suspicious of a given paradigm's
version of its science's history, for, like nations and
individuals, scientific disciplines selectively revise
their accounts of the past to better legitimate the form-
ulations of the present. The introspectionists
,
today
widely 'remembered' as scientifically naive, as previously
noted, were in their own eyes as indisputably scientific
as today's researcher with his pocket calculator and
computer printout. According to Rychlak (1968)1
The great advocate of American introspection,
Titchener, proposed that we accept his tool
as a methodological standard, a vehicle for
evidence which he took to be validational. For
him, science was an act of trained observation,
followed by analysis of data. The more direct
the observation, the better the science. Meas-
urement and experimentation were viewed as
"roundabout" ways of practicing observation....
The most direct means of gaining scientific
knowledge was through the exercise of trained,
disinterested, self-observation and analysis.
P. 203
Does every paradigm pass its own version of science
as the true scientific method, then? It would seem so, and
from noting it we might obtain a liberating sense of
flexibility and relativity in science.
But at the moment we are the seeming prisoners of
our own paradigm which, as Deese has suggested, emulates
the model of Victorian physics. Is it any wonder, then,
if we convert our subject matter into physics-like dimen-
sions? The operant, to take an example from psychology
at large, is a particle of behavior, whose lawlike prop-
erties are sufficiently abstract as to exist conceptually
independently of time and place or even of the organism
whose operant it is. It is, in short, the atom of behavior.
Certain procedures employed in personality research
show the influence of physicalistic science. A good example
is the idea of a one-step assay, the idea, deeply embedded
in our research practices that important information
about human existence can be obtained by a simple, speedy,
one-time measurement. The model here is temperature-taking,
or assaying the purity of an ore. We believe we can take
our subjects' temperatures for need for achievement or for
ego development , obtain a permanent score, and be done in
5 or 20 minutes. Small wonder that so much research in
personality involves less than an hour's direct contact
of researcher and subject—and often enough that hour is
sufficient time for the researcher to assay all his
subjects, 50 to 500, in mass testing. Research projects
involving no face-to-face contact between subject and
experimenter are not uncommon.
Let us step back from the argument and consider what
has been said. Methodological commitments have consequence.s
for the kinds of questions raised--and not raised--by a
science. If, in psychology, the criterion for reality
becomes equated with the prediction and control of behavior,
the nature of the problems individual psychologists work on
will reflect that criterion. While the chief riddle cf
personality had once been the structure and organization
of individuality—the kind of problem that might be solved
by one or another general theory of personality, today's
riddle involves the discovery of that which will enable
the prediction and control of behavior. Instead of a general
theory of personality, an adequate solution might take
the form of a regression equation involving discrete,
easily operationalized and quantified personality variables-
such as the equations and variables developed by Rotter
and Cattell.
We can summarize the effects of today's paradigm by
suggesting a kind of parlor game, one that. can be played at
a cocktail party. The goal is to learn what one can about
human existence, and the other persons present are all
available as sources of information. 3ut there are limits
upon the collection cf information. The only questions
allowable are those that can be answered quantitatively.
Additionally, the truth of any statement is contingent
upon its being externally and publicly obvious. Finally,
no more than 10 minutes of direct face-to-face exposure
to any one person are allowed.
How likely is it that important information can be
obtained when we are limited to questions that are quant-
itatively phrased, and by research designs involving
minimal exposure to subjects? How likely are we to delve
into the depths of personality when we adopt as a method
an outlook quite blind to the non-quantifiable aspects of
human existence? Clearly, the methodological commitments
of today's paradigm have conceptual ramifications. As
Hudson (1973) states:
This wholesale concern with what people actually
do with their lives--as scientists, politicians,
salesmen, husbands, parents, students—rather
than simply with their answers to psychological
tests, is something that has been lost almost
entirely from psychology. Evidence about people's
lives is new treated as though it were vaguely
unseemly.
P. 16?
In place of "unseemly," I would substitute "invisible."
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CHAPTER III
THE BEST OF ALL POSSIBLE PARADIGMS? AN HISTORICAL INQUIRY
Adopting the prediction and control of behavior as its
chief validational method, today's behavior ist personality
paradigm represents a host of physicalistic
,
quantitative,
and externalistic methodological presuppositions, forming,
in sum, a tacit but compelling background reality shaping
psychological conceptualizing and research. This paradigm
encourages an impoverished conceptualization of personhood,
blinding us to both the depth and the organization of
inner experience. We have reduced the person into a col-
lection of variables organized to suit the specifications
of regression equations rather than any 'natural contours'
of human beings.
I am suggesting, then, that our paradigm is inappro-
priate to our subject matter, a depressing circumstance if
true. But to speak in Kuhnian terms, as I do here, would
seem to require adopting a relativistic view that would
make claims about a paradigm's being well or poorly suited
to a discipline wholly arbitrary and subjective. Are there
grounds for considering one paradigm more or less suited
to a discipline's subject matter than, or better or worse
than, another?
The question is tricky. The temptation is great to use
the criteria of one paradigm to judge another. We are
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commonly told, for example, that the theories of personality
failed as examples of scientific formulations because they
are inadequate to the task of predicting behavior. This
criticism assumes a universality to contemporary criteria
which, at least historically, they do not have. This critic-
ism is blind to the possibility that such theories succeed
as scientific formulations in terms of the criteria of the
paradigm out of which they grew, a paradigm I shall call
the personalistic personality paradigm and which I shall
elaborate upon below.
The concept of paradigm essentially suggests that we
never perceive reality in neutral or non-paradigm depend-
ent terms, but even so, I believe paradigms can be evaluated
o
in terms that are neither necessarily biased nor unfair.
In this essay I shall discuss the adequacy of personal-
ity psychology's paradigms through an historical perspective.
The argument can be made, for example, that a paradigm
"works" to the extent that it provides sufficient numbers
of solvable puzzles for its constituents. Kuhn (1970b) has
gone so far as to suggest that providing solvable puzzles
is the criterion for determining that a field is a science.
The vast amount of research dene in personality today is
ample evidence that today's paradigm supplies solvable
puzzles. But the availability of puzzles cannot simply be
equated with their intrinsic goodness , and to argue _ that
today's behavior ist paradigm "works" in this sense is
certainly not to demonstrate that it is, for personality,
the best of all possible paradigms.
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Today's paradigm, I argue, has usurped the place cf an
earlier paradigm, or, at least, has prevented the full
flowering and articulation of an earlier paradigm, now
lost. I will argue that this earlier paradigm, snuffed
out by today's behavioristic one, was better adapted to
the subject matter of personality and more promising than
the paradigm now in ascendance.
What I am suggesting, however, seems to contradict
the thrust of Kuhn's vision of scientific development.
While Kuhn has been explicit in denying any teleological
development toward truth, he envisions the sequence of
normal science, from anomaly and crisis, to paradigm
revolution, to normal science again, and so on, as
essentially an evolutionary process. Kuhn (1970a) makes
clear the Darwinian parallel:
The net result of a sequence of such revol-
utionary selections, separated by periods of
normal research, is the wonderfully adapted
set of instruments we call modern scientific
knowledge. Successive stages in that develop-
mental process are marked by an increase in
articulation and specialization. And the entire
process may have occurred, as we now suppose
biological evolution did, without benefit of
a set goal, a permanent fixed scientific truth,
of which each stage in the development of
scientific knowledge is a better exemplar.
pp. 172-173
Kuhn's position, then, would seem to be that whatever the
problems of today's paradigm, it ought to be better—in
the sense of better adapted—than the paradigm which
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preceeded it.
Can the view that today's paradigm is better adapted
to the subject matter of personality be supported? What
seems called for is an historical comparison of paradigm
change in personality psychology with Kuhn's model of
scientific revolution. Does the history of personality
psychology sufficiently parallel Kuhn's model of scientific
development to justify the conclusion that today's
paradigm is the fittest?
A consideration of personality psychology's history
is a surprisingly difficult task, for I found no explicit-
history of the field as an academic disciple. This lack
has been noted by other writers (Hudson, 1975; Rychlak,
1968). Textbooks are of little help, implying, typically,
a chronological development of theories from Freud's to,
say, Cattell's, suggesting that with Freud's first
publications the field of personality get under way.
Accounts of philosophical conceptualizations of
personhood, such as Burnham's (1968) "Historical Back-
ground for the Study of Personality," suggest we view pre-
sent models of personhood as the flourishing in modern
hues of ideas that have their origins in germinal philo-
sophical roots, ignoring, it would seem, the issue of how
institutionalization into an academic discipline car. mark
the beginning of a new kind of enterprise for studying
personality. Kuhn notes (1970a) in his postscript that the
k9
concept of paradigm is tied in with the existence of a
community of scholars. A discipline is an interlocking
community, united by a common set of journals, research
literature, academic courses, and the like. What is
missing is an historical account of the community of
scholars who considered themselves personality psycholo-
gists.
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Kuhn
suggests that any science quite normally distorts its
field's history in order better tc socialize new members
into the belief that the present formulations represent
only the fruits of the past, and that these contemporary
formulations, moreover, are logically mandated by everythin
that had come before. So it should not be surprising
to discover what amounts to a coverup of history in
psychology. Our textbooks, as Kuhn suggests they should,
indulge in distortions that at times seem shameless.
Consider, for example, the impressions Muss en, Rozenzweig,
et . al. (1973) give to introductory psychology students of
how psychology has developed:
The continual growth of psychology as a
scientific discipline makes it hard to define.
Originally, about a century ago, psychology was
defined as "the study of the mind "--the normal,
adult, European, human mind. Each of these
limiting adjectives was eventually discarded--
psychologists began to investigate abnormal as
well as normal individuals, children as well as
adults, people in other cultures as well as
Europeans, and animals as well as human beings.
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Even the noun was changed from "mind" to
"behavior." The study of the individual v/as
supplemented by studies of groups and
societies
.
P. 5
The implication that the shift in focus from mind to
behavior is merely another instance of removing cumber-
some, limiting adjectives standing in the way of "con-
tinual growth" to me is shocking, but such shock pre-
supposes sufficient distance from today's paradigm to
recognize the difference between a science of mind and
a science of behavior. For the crop of students socialized
to the behavior ist paradigm, the belief implied above,
that in psychology every day in every way things are get-
ting better and better, is a glib truism requiring not even
a second thought.
Without a clear sense of the origin and history of the
discipline, personality psychologists stand in danger of
swallowing entire the saccharined bromide that the field,
like any science, progresses through an accumulation of
increasingly refined and time-tested truths, discarding
along the way formulations that prove less tenable than
their more modern competitors and replacements.
The nebulous sense of history a personality psycholo-
gist might pick up would sound something like this : In the
late 1800' s Freud and his followers, physicians, began
treating psychologically disturbed persons, and in the
51
process developed some creative, albeit largely unscient-
ific, theories of personality. Since then other thinkers,
typically psychologists engaged in clinical practice,
but not always, have developed competing theories. However
interesting, these theories suffered when psychologists
in personality became increasingly rigorous in their
scientific standards. When it actually came to testing
these theories in a scientifically proper fashion, they
did not hold up at all. The trend in recent years has been
to develop more rigorous, smaller, testable conceptions:
more hypotheses than vague general theories.
Part of the beauty of this fuzzy history lies in its
justification and legitimation of current practice. The old
toots of the past meant well, you see, but they had not
quite got the knack of science, which is hardly surprising
when you consider the antique modes of conveyance they
probably used (Hanson cabs and the like) as well as the
quill pens with which they probably indited their arm-
chair begotten thoughts.
But that dream of history is false. Personality psych-
ology as an academic discipline in America did not begin
with Freud. A reasonable starting place is 1924 at Harvard
where Gordon Allport taught what is believed to be the
first personality course in American higher education.
Let us examine what we can about the history of American
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personality psychology; the survey that follows sheds
light on the transition of paradigms in our field.
;/e begin with Allport, for a good case can be made that
he brought the field to America and, with his 193? text-
book, for many years defined it.
Allport
.
We are fortunate that Allport (1968) has
provided in his essay "An Autobiography" an account of the
personal influences that spurred the development of per-
sonality psychology. As an undergraduate at Harvard
Allport was exposed to the psychology of his day. He took
Hugo '.'lunsterberg' s course, reading in the process that
professor's 191^ text, Psychology; General and Applied .
About the course Allport notes, "I learned little except
that 'causal' psychology was not the same thing as
•purposive' psychology" (p. 380).^ Allport's training,
not surprisingly, was highly steeped in the tradition of
Germanic influence in American psychology, that link from
Wundt to Titchener. Allport, who won the Sheldon travel
yThat Munsterberg's class left some deep impression
on Allport is indicated by his remarks in his 25th Reunion
Report: "Professionally, I have been trying to solve a few
of the riddles of human nature. Sometimes, while holding
forth from the platform in Emerson D, I ask myself whether
we have made much progress since Professor I'dinsterberg
expanded on 'Ze causal and purposive nature of ze mind'
to our class at the sleepy two o'clock hour from the same
rostrum back in 1916." (25th Reunion Repor t, Harvard Glass
of 1919, 19W.
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fellowship in 1922, spoke of his decision to study in
Germany as follows :
The German tradition in psychology was still
strong in America, although Germany itself had
been flattened by World War I and inflation. It
was only natural for me to head for Germany.
William James and E. E. Titchener had immortalized
in^ their textbooks the Teutonic foundations of our
science, and my own teachers had studied there.
p. 386
But what he found as a striking influence in Germany was
not a continuation of the strand of Germanic psychology
to which he had been previously exposed:
I was not prepared, however, for the power-
ful impact of my German teachers who included
the aged Stumpf and Dessoir, the younger -lax
Wertheimer, Wolfgang Kohler, and Eduard Spranger
in Berlin, and in Hamburg, William Stern and
Heinz Werner. A fellow student was He inrich
Kluver, who helped me with my halting German,
and who has remained a cherished friend ever
since even though our paths of psychological
interest have diverged.
At that time Gestalt was a new concept.
I had not heard of it before leaving Cambridge.
It took me some weeks to discover why my
teachers usually started their two-hour lectures
with a castigation of David Hume. 3oon I learned
he was a natural whipping boy for the German
structural schools of thought. Ganzheit and
Gestalt , Struktur and Leftenformen and die
unteilb'are Perso'n were new music to my ears.
Here was the kind of psychology^ I had been
longing for but did not know existed.
pp. 396-387
The experience in Germany enabled Allport to develop a
psychology that was simply not a continuation of the
American psychology of the time. There was, with the
founding of personality psychology, a new root, independent
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of both the Titchener ian-Wundtian tradition and of the new
Watsonian behavior is ts
. When Allport returned to the
United States he pioneered this new kind of psychology.
That his thinking had departed from the kind of psychology
done in the American 2ast is illustrated by an incident
concerning Allport' s doctoral dissertation and the great
Titchener himself.
Allport* s dissertation, "An Experimental Study of the
Traits of Personality: With Special Reference to the Prob-
lem of Social Diagnosis," was, according to Allport, "per-
haps the first American dissertation written explicitly
on the question of the component traits of personality"
(P. 385). As his work neared completion, he was invited
with other graduate students bo Clark University, to
attend the select gathering of Titchener ian experimental-
ists :
After two days of discussing problems in
sensory psychology Titchener allotted three
minutes to each visiting graduate to describe
his own investigations. I reported on the traits
of personality and was punished by the rebuke
of total silence from the group, punctuated by
a glare of disapproval from Titchener. Later
Titchener demanded of Langfeld, "Why did you
let him work on that problem?" Back in Cambridge
Langfeld again consoled me with the laconic
remark, "You don't care what Titchener thinks."
And I found that I did not.
P. 335
In his own terms Allport saw himself "standing at a
frontier" (p. 385), as pursuing "deviant" (p. 335) and
"maverick" (p. 386) interests. Looking back from the van-
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tage point of the late 1960's, Allport could say, "Later,
of course, the field of personality became not only accept-
able but highly fashionable."
The case I am arguing is that personality psychology's
origins were independent of the major traditions warring
for control of psychology in the arena of American academic
psychology in the 1920' s. Although the mistaken notion
of history suggests gradual and measured progression and
change, the actual history of American psychology is in
some ways reminiscent of the warring Goths after the fall
of Rome. The big positions were held by the Titchenerian-
'.Vundtian introspectionists and by the new-fangled, Amer-
ican behavior ists . In the midst of this war, personality
psychology had its independent origin. Its paradigm, too,
would be independent.
It should be clear from Titchener's glare of dis-
approval that Allport' s personality psychology differed
sufficiently from the Titchenerian view of what psychology
ought to be. It is equally true that Allport' s vision
of psychology conflicted with that of the behaviorists
who eventually eclipsed the introspectionists and whose
paradigm established itself as a monopoly in American
psychology. While Allport 's interest in the pattern of
organization of such "inner" variables as personality
traits and the self conflicts on the most obvious levels
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of conceptual content with behaviorism, underlying dif-
ferences in the nature of method in psychology also
existed, and these differences are noteworthy.
The differences can be expressed in terms of an
understanding of science. 3y the time his I96I text was
published, when American psychology was deeply wedded to
its behaviorist paradigm, Allport* s protesting views stood
in sharp relief. He believed that methods should derive
from subject matter, not vice-versa:
Since positivism seeks nomothetic general-
izations about behavior it is likely to regard
curiosity about the internal order of mind-in-
particular as subjective and "unscientific." It
somehow seems more scientific to send a platoon
of white rats through a maze than to occupy
oneself with the complex organization of a
concrete personality. It is more respectable
to pursue averages and probabilities for pop-
ulations than to study the life-style of one
person. Such preference is net hard to explain
in a culture that is technological and machine-
centered. . . .
The only real difficulty with the positivist
formulation is that it does not know (or rarely
knows) that it is a prisoner of a specific
philosophical outlook, also of a specific period
of culture, and of a narrow definition of
"science." Positivism seldom defends its det-
erministic, quasi-mechanical view of the human
person; it merely takes it for granted.
P. 551
Clearly Allport defines himself apart from the dom-
inent paradigm of the day. Examples of Allport* s jousting
with the methodological prescriptions of the positivist,
behaviorist paradigm are common, for Allport was famous
for his stand championing the validity of research into
individuality, claiming that we cannot study "personality
in general" because individuals do not exist in general,
only in particular.
The understanding of science inherent in the behavior
ist paradigm stresses the universality of elements: all
oxygen embodies the same properties, universal laws
relate the rate of fall to the mass of objects, and so
on. The operant, to translate this expectation into the
current paradigm, regardless of the organism, follows
universal laws (e.g., the law of effect). Allport, in
his 1937 text, argues against this conception of science:
The person who is a unique and never-repeated
phenomenon evades the traditional scientific
approach at every step. In fact, the more
science advances, the less do its discoveries
resemble the individual life with its patent
continuities, mobility, and reciprocal pene-
tration of functions. * •
Starting with an infinitely more complex
subject-matter than the other biological
sciences, but with the same presuppositions,
the psychologist has isolated his fragmentary
elements, has generalized and verified his
findings in the manner of the austere elder
sciences. He has succeeded in discovering
orderly processes in the "generalized mind,
"
but the phenomenon of individuality, so
deliberately excluded, returns to haunt him.
V/hether he delimits his science as the study of
the mind, the soul, of behavior, purpose,
consciousness, or human nature, --the persist-
ent, indestructible fact of organization in
terms of individuality is always present. To
abstract a generalized human mind from a pop-
ulation of active, prepossessing, well-knit per-
sons is a feat of questionable value. The
eneralized human mind is entirely mythical;
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it lacks the most essential characteristics
of mind, — locus, organic quality, reciprocal
action of parts, and self-consciousness.
This exclusion of the individual from pu-^
psychology has led to many anomalies. It has,
for example, often been pointed out that the
psychologist, in spite of his profession, is
not a
>
superior judge of people. He should be,
but his ascetic and meager formulae derived
from "generalized mind" do not go far in
accounting for the peculiar richness and
uniqueness of minds that are organic and single.
P. 5
The dominent conception of science in psychology,
Allport felt, results in an inadequate understanding of
personhood. It was his desire that the field of person-
ality sidestep these methodological quagmires. Put simply,
he intended for personality psychology something new.
Procedures must derive not from a borrowed, prior con-
ception of science, but rather from the nature of the
subject matter under study. Allport (19^2) wrote, "What-
ever contributes to a knowledge of human nature is an
admissible method to science" (p. 35).
Allport favored the study of the individual as such,
and in his compilation of research methods for personality
psychologists ( cf. , Allport
,
1961, chapters 17 and 18) he
included case-study interviewing, personal record research,
and other procedures open to information not essentially
of the codifiable and quantitative variety. Under his
editorship the Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,
which became the very Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology discussed in the first chapter, commonly
.
published case studies, a format unthinkable in today's
journal. Allport accepted the reality of the inner exper-
ience of selfhood, so his methodological prescriptions
could not be blind to subjects' subjectivity. He believed
that the most revealing single question one could put to
a subject was this: What future are you trying to bring
about for yourself?
In this brief account of Allport 's influence I have
stressed his methodological independence more than I have
the originality of his personalistic conceptualizations,
partly because the latter are more widely known. Even
so, from the passages I have quoted a sense of that per-
sonalistic focus can surely be gleaned, and no doubt can
exist that the personality psychology Allport envisioned
differs from that practiced today.
But in order to speak of an independent, personalis
t
paradigm predating today's behaviorist personality para-
digm, it must be shown that other psychologists shared
Allport 's independence from the behaviorist paradigm
otherwise spreading through American psychology.
Murray. Writing in his Explorations of Personality ,
Henry A. Murray (1938), another pioneer of personality
psychology, makes plain his willingness to explore per-
sonality according to lights both new and maverick:
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Our emphasis was upon emotional and behav-ioural reactions
,
what previous experiencesdetermined them, to what degree and in whatmanner. This preoccupation let our studies
somewhat aside the university tradition' Forit has been the custom in academic psychologyto concentrate upon the perceptive and cognitive
t22V£ *?• hUman mind °r ' more recently,upon he behaviour of animals.
pp. vii-viii
That the work of Murray, conducted as the first self-
styled personologist, lay "somewhat outside the univ-
ersity tradition" is captured by the recollections of
graduate study recorded by Hevitt Sanford (1976), one
of Murray's former graduate students, now president of
the Wright Institute:
In^the 1930s, the Harvard Psychological
Clinic was housed in a frame building some
distance removed from Emerson Hall, the
seat of the philosophy department, which
included psychology. Teaching as well as
research and clinical work was done at the
Clinic, which under the leadership of
Henry Murray became something of a hotbed
for
_ deviant ideas. Freud, Jung, Piaget, and
various other European psychologists were
studied there, as was the new dynamic
psychology of Murray. Students developed
strong loyalties to the Clinic and grew
passionate about its distinguishing ideas.
Emerson Hall, where the tried and true in
psychology was laid claim to, tended to be
regarded as enemy territory. A student who
had done his dissertation at the Clinic
prepared for his oral examination by
mobilizing his aggression.
P. 757
Murray (1938) believed that in a rough sense psych-
ologists could be categorized into "peripheralists " and
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"centralists" (pp. 6ff ). The peripheralists represent the
paradigm presently in favor among psychologists; it includes
an "objectivistic inclination." Such psychologists are
"attracted to clearly observable things and qualities"
and are positivist ic
,
mechanistic, and elementaristic
:
The peripheralists are mostly academic
men addicted to the methodology of science.
Being chiefly interested in what is meas-
urable, they are forced to limit themselves
to relatively unimportant fragments of the
personality or to the testing of specific
skills. The aim is to get figures that may
be worked statistically.
P. 9
The centralists, in contrast, "are especially attracted
to subjective facts of emotional or purposive significance."
They are "conceptualists rather than positivists" arid are
holists who "believe that personality is a complex unity,
of which each function is merely a partially distinguished
integral." Centralists trust empathic intuition and ex-
plain human functioning in dynamic term??.
While the research Murray and his colleagues pursued
c
in Explorat ions was sufficiently varied to include pro-
*
cedures both peripheralist and centralist, Murray's own
work falls clearly in the centralist category. Murray was
skeptical of the tendency he observed among psychologists
to assert their credibility as scientists. This skepti-
cism must be due in part to Murray's own broad professional
experience in biology, chemistry, and medicine, which
taught him that science was not a matter of specific
6procedures nor even specific instruments, but rather a
process that must always reflect the 'demand character-
istics' of its subject matter. Consider his (1938)state-
ment
:
Some psychologists have an almost relig-
ious attachment to physical apparatus taken
over from the fundamental disciplines: physics,
chemistry, and physiology. Working with such
contrivances they have the 'feel' of being
purely scientific, and thus dignified. Some-
times this is nothing but a groundless fantasy,
since what has made these methods scientific
is the
f
fact that applied to other objects they
have yielded answers to important questions.
It is dubious whether many crucial problems
in psychology can be solved by instruments.
Certainly if physical appliances do not give
results which lead to conceptual understanding,
it is not scientific to employ them. For the
all important characteristic of a good scient-
ific method is its efficiency in revealing
general truths
.
p. 26
V/e see in Murray's case, as we had in Allport's, a
willingness to question the conception of science other-
wise capturing the field of psychology. This quality of
standing apart, of seeing a need for a new way of studyin
human subjects, underscores the contention I am making,
that as formulated originally, personality psychology
offered a paradigm— or the first gropings of a paradigm-
-
quite distinct from what had been passed down from the
battles among the major traditions of American psychology
and which now has carried the day even among personality
psychologists
.
Murray's position is clearly maverick. His formal
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undergraduate training in psychology, unlike Allport's, I
was cut short by, ironically enough, Hugo MUnsterberg*
s
course at Harvard:
At college a bud of interest in psychology
was nipped by the chill of Professor Munster-
berg's approach. In the middle of his second
lecture I began looking for the nearest
exit
.
19^0; p. 152
?.1urray pursued a career in medicine and science, and his I
work led him to wonder "why some of the men with whom
I was associated at the Rockefeller Institute clung
so tenaciously to diametrically opposing views about the
simplest phenomena." Murray's curiosity led him to Jung's
Psychological Types , which so impressed him he arranged
a visit with Jung in 1925. To this meeting Murray
attributes his change of professions into psychology:
On the crest of a wave I visited Dr. Jung
in Zurich supposedly to discuss abstractions;
but in a day or two to my astonishment enough
affective stuff erupted to invalid a pure
scientist. This was my first opportunity to
weigh psychoanalysis in a balance; and I recom-
mend it as one method of measuring the worth
of any brand of psychology. Take your mysteries,
your knottiest dilemmas, to a fit exponent of
a system and judge the latter by its power
to order and illuminate your whole being. This
assuredly is a most exacting test, to apply the
touchstone of your deep perplexity to a theory,
to demand that it interpret what you presumably
know best
—
yourself. 3ut then, what good is a
theory that folds up in a crisis? In deciding
such a test, of course, the temperament and talent
of the psychologist (or physician) are often
more important than his system; but a healthy
and critical inquirer capable of some detachment
may succeed in approximately weighing out this
influence, In 1925, however, I had no scales
to weigh out Dr. Jung, the first full-blooded,
spherical—and Goethian, 1 should day—intel-
ligence I had ever met, the man whom the jud-
icious Prinzhorn called "the ripest fruit on
the tree of psycho-analytic knowledge." We
talked for hours, sailing down the lake and
smoking before the hearth of his Faust ian
retreat, "The great flood-gates of the wonder-
world swung open," and I saw things that my
philosophy had never dreamt of. Within a
month a score of bi-horned problems were
resolved, and I went off decided on depth
psychology. I had experienced the unconscious,
something not drawn out of books.
19^0; p. 153
Murray, then, came to personality not through a
socialization within psychology, but from the outside,
a pattern not unusual among personality theorists
(e.g., Kelly, Rogers), and suggestive of how independ-
ence from the orthodox paradigm comes about. Morton
Prince, director of the Harvard Psychological Clinic, pro
vided Murray with a position. As Murray (19^0) note3,
"No man more ignorant of textbook knowledge was ever
admitted to a department of psychology; but Professor
Boring was a liberal and I stayed" (p. l^'O
.
Murray' 3 initial reactions to academic psychologists
at work indicate his own distance from the reigning
presuppositions concerning the proper study of Mani
At firr;t I was taken aback, having vaguely
expected that most academic psychologists would
be interested in Mian functioning in his envir-
onment. But not at all: almost everyone was
nailed down to some piece of apparatus, meas-
uring a small segment of the nervous system as
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^^ ?he e^ails. I was in
ors are eye, ear, nose, and throat specialist
since "hesff ^ +int-^ed m* were
P
n" rationed,
iSn?«? ,rf?-5eS? n0t susc ePtible to exact exper
eeoloSv SiSii0?' a standa^d that rules out
^
af. Paleontology, anthropology, embryology,most of medicine, sociology, and devine astron-
™li+lLml ?hlf? *ira had been to "work with Shegreatest scientific precision" I would never havpquit electrolytes and gases. I had changed becameof a consuming interest in other matter?! inproblems of motivation and emotion. To try towork these out on human subjects was to become
a literary or applied psychologist, a pract-itioner of mental hygiene, outside and lookingin upon the real psychologists who, I concluded,
were obsessed by anxious aims to climb the
S(
?
al
.
°/ scientists and join the elect ofthis day s uod at any cost. What else could
account for their putting manners (appliances
and statistics) so far ahead of ends (importance
of the problems studied)? No matter how trivial
th e> conclusions, if his coefficients were
reliable, an experimenter was deemed pure and
sanctified.
19^0; p. 154
And what procedures had Murray to offer to replace the
isolated studies of segments of the nervous system? Like
Allport, Murray was fairly open to any procedure that would
provide information about personhood. Murray believed that
an adequate understanding of a person would take the
form of a total life record or biographical understanding;
among the techniques employed in the 1938 study—which
sought to generate a theory of personality on the basis
of two-year interviews of 50 normally functioning persons--
was the psychological autobiography. Murray's team employed
structured interviews, questionnaires, symbolic play tech-
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niques (Erik Homburger, later Srikson, participated in
Murray's project), musical reverie experiences, and a
host of other inventive procedures. Murray developed
and employed the Thematic Apperceptive Test (TAT), a pro-
jective devise designed to bring to the surface indications
of the subject's subconscious needs and concerns.
The use of many of these techniques, especially the
TAT, carries the implicit expectation that the important
data of personality are found at a remove from direct,
superficial scrutiny. The person is not suited especially
to simple, external calibration. Murray was, after all,
a believer in the dynamic role played by unconscious,
inner elements of self, as the following statement (19^0)
vividly suggests
:
I can hardly think myself back tc the myopia
that once so seriously restricted my view of
human nature, so natural has it become for me
to receive impressions of wishes, dramas and
assumptions that underlie the acts and talk of
everyone I meet. Instead of seeing merely a
groomed American in a business suit, travelling
to and from his office like a rat in a maze, a
predatory, ambulating apparatus of reflexes,
habits, stereotypes, and slogans, a bundle of
consistencies, conformities, and allegiances
to this or that institution—a robot in other
words--I visualize (just as I visualize the
activity of his internal organs) a flow of
powerful subjective life, conscious and uncon-
scious; a whispering gallery in which voices
In stressing the importance of the subconscious
Murray chiefly takes issue with Allpcrt. Murray cnce
remarked to me in a tone of merry incredulity that Allport
thought the subconscious influence "was no larger than
a pea.
"
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?Sn?^T°
m
^i! ^ Stai?t past ' a gulf stream of
c™ifn^th *lo*?lnS Emories of past events,urrents of contending complexes, plots and
counterplots^ hopeful intimations and ideals.To a neurologist such perspectives are absurd,
archaic, tender-minded; but in truth they are
much closer to the actualities of inner life than
are his own neat diagrams of reflex arcs and
nerve anastomeses. A personality is a full Con-gress of orators and pressure groups, of children,demagogues, communists, isolationists, war-
mongers, mugwumps, grafters, log-rollers,
lobbyists, Caesars and Christs, Machiavels and
Judases, Torries and Promethean revolutionists.
And a psychologist who does not know this
in himself, whose mind is locked against the
flux of images and feelings, should be encour-
aged to make friends, by being psychoanalyzed,
with the various members of his household.
pp. 160-161
Murray's skepticism that much of an understanding of
personhood could ever come from obsessive concerns with
scientific-seeming techniques and procedures, his con-
tempt for the externalized view of the individual which,
as he remarks, converts one into a "robot," and his
emphasis upon the multifaceted arena of subjective, inner
life all mark Murray's approach as deviant from the para-
digm that guides and determines research and thinking in
personality psychology today.
But what is even more distinguishing is Murray's
implicit assumption that the goal of the disciple is an
understanding of personhood which, as I hope becomes
increasingly apparent, is not the same thing as--is not
a necessary consequence of--the prediction and control of
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behavior through the use of personality variables. Like
Allport, Murray believed in the holistic nature of per-
sonality, and thus stressed personality organization. Murray 1
focus upon the person as such is suggested by his use of
"personology" to replace "psychology of personality, "
which he (1938) considered a ''clumsy and tautological
expression" (p. k) ,
Much attention has been placed upon establishing
both Allport and Murray's independence from today's
paradigm, because the two of them pioneered the field
of personality. Hall and Lindzey's (1970) widely respected
text is dedicated to Allport and Murray (as well as to
Edward Tolman). Daniel Levinson, in his preface to
Rychlak's (1968) A Philosophy o f Science for Personality
Theory
,
notes :
The study of personality was estbalished as
a legitimate field only in the late 193°'s,
primarily through the writings of Allport,
Lew in, and Murray and through the entry cf
psychoanalysis into the academic scene.
p. viii
The presuppositions underlying the study of person-
ality as it began with Allport and Murray differ from
those in force today; these differences include both
the overall conceptualization of personhood as well as
the discipline's major goals.
Do Allport and Murray alone establish the existence
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of a paradigm predating today's? The case will now be
argued that their personalistic paradigm extended to other,
more recent personality psychologists. % aim is to estab-
lish the existence of an independent personality para-
digm, now more or less forgotten.
Kelly
.
A personality theorist whose career pattern,
as noted, is typical of the breed is George Kelly, whose
reputation was established by the 1955 publication of
The Psychology of Personal Constructs. Like Murray, Kelly
was not charmed by the psychology he encountered as an
undergraduate in the American midwest, in his case the
behaviorism of the 1920's. He writes ( Mahar
, 1969):
In the first course in psychology that I
took I sat in the back row of a very large
class, tilted my chair against the wall, made
myself as comfortable as possible, and kept
one ear cocked for anything interesting that
might turn up. One day the professor, a very
nice person who seemed to be trying hard to
convince himself that psychology was something
to be taken seriously, turned to the black-
board and wrote an "S," an arrow, and an "R.
"
Thereupon I straightened up my chair and list-
ened, thinking to myself that now, after two
or three weeks of preliminaries, we might be
getting to the meat of the matter.
Although I listened intently for several
sessions after that the most I could make of
it was that the "S" was what you had to have
in order to account for the "R" and the "R"
was put there so the "3" would have something
to account for. I never did find out what that
arrow stood for--not to this day- -and I have
pretty well given up trying to figure it out.
I can see, of course, that once you step into
this solipsism you can go round and round
without feeling obligated to come up with
anything useful.
pp. ^6-^7
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Kelly's impatience with psychology led him away to
other fields, to math and physics, sociology, and education.
His dissertation in 1931 concerned common factors in
speech and hearing disorders. He came back to psychology
much as did Murray. With his fresh Ph.D. he was given
responsibility for providing clinical psychology services
to the Kansas school system; he had no previous training
in clinical psychology.
No one will accuse Kelly of allegiance to the explan-
atory concepts of behaviorism, but his writing also makes
clear that the methodological presuppositions defining
today's behaviorist paradigm were also part of the sol-
ipsism Kelly did not care to go round and round in.
3ecause Kelly's conceptualization of the personal con-
struct system is quite close to Kuhn's concept of para-
digm, it is hardly surprising that Kelly, himself,
identified and labelled the paradigm status of behav-
iorist psychology:
Cut of all this I have gradually developed
the notion that psychology is pretty much con-
fined to the paradigms it employs and, while
you can take off in a great many directions
and travel a considerable distance in any one
of them— as indeed we have with stimulus-
response psychology—there is no harm in con-
sorting with a strange paradigm now and then.
Indeed the notion has occurred to me that
psychology may best be regarded as a collect-
ion of paradigms wooed by ex-physicists, ex-
physiologists, and ex-preachers, as well as a
lot of other intellectual renegades...
Kahar, 1969; p. LW
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Kelly was, not surprisingly, aware—admirably aware--
of the consequences of subscribing to a paradigm. Illus-
trating his distance from the presuppositions of the
behavior ist personality paradigm is, thus, relatively
easy. Regarding the sanctity of physics-like procedures,
Kelly (1958) notes:
There is nothing especially revelational
about events that happen in an experimental
laboratory—other events that happen elsewhere
are just as real and are just as worthy of
attention. Even the fact that an event took
place in a manner predicted by the experimenter
gives it no particular claim to being a
special revelation from nature. That an exper-
imenter's predictions come true means only that
he has hit upon one of many possible systems
for making predictions that come true. He may
be no more than a wee bit closer to a genuine
understanding of things as they really are.
Indeed, the fact that he has hit upon one such
way of predicting outcomes may even blind him
to alternatives which might have proved far
more productive in the long run.
P. 35
Especially noteworthy in Kelly's remark is the implied
distinction between one's ability to make predictions and
one's genuine understanding of one's subject matter. We
have encountered this implication before. It is typical j
of today's behaviorist paradigm to equate explanation with
the capacity to predict and control; more characteristic
of what I am calling the personalistic personality para-
digm is an equating of explanation with meaningful under-
standing—with insights into the nature of personhood.
Throughout the passages included from the writings of
Allport, Murray, and Kelly is the implication that the
understanding of personhood is the field's goal.
But returning to Kelly's specific independence from
the behaviorist paradigm, we find support again in his
remarks concerning the enchantment of psychologists with
operational definition:
The writing of the physicist Bridgeman
has had considerable influence among psych-
ological theorists. There has been a new
emphasis upon the need for operational def-
inition of the variables envisioned in one's
experiments. Carried to the extreme that some
psychologists would carry it, this would mean
that no theoretical statement could be made
unless each part referred to something palp-
able. It is this kind of extremism which has
led to the quip that while psychiatrists
would rather be abstruse than right, psych-
ologists would rather be wrong than abstruse.
1955; P. 28
Beyond questioning the positivistic certainty of
experimental predictions and operational definition, Kelly
does not interpret the prediction and control of behav-
ior—indeed, the role of behavior--as the great criter-
ion of verification so characteristic of today's para-
digm. According to Kelly (Mahar, 1969 ), explaining
behavior is not the important question:
The languages of western Europe are con-
structed so as to imply that the logic of
explaining behavior is based on the S-R unit.
This is to say that the behavioral cycle with
which we are concerned is one that starts
with a stimulus and asks the question, "What
response will ensue?" In effect this means that
the stimulus is the question and the response
is the answer. This model is implicit in
Freudian theory and indeed it is implicit in
most dynamic theories. Behavior is the answer;
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it is the thing we are seeking to produce. Inpsychotherapy the object is to get the patientto change his behavior. In learning, also, the
object is to get the student to change his behav-
ior. In industry the object is to get the employee
to do his job. In politics the object is to getthe citizen to support the leadership. Once you
are able to produce the behavior you are seeking,
you have your answer. Indeed, most psychologists
like to say that they are primarily concerned
with the production of behavior. I think this is
very sad.
But from the standpoint of personal construct
theory, behavior is not the answer, it is the
question. The personal construct theorist who
serves in the psychotherapeutic capacity does
not consider his objective the production of
certain classes of behavior. He is concerned,
rather, with the constructions that man, includ-
ing himself and his patient, places upon that
world and how these constructions are tested
out. For him, behavior is not the answer, it is
the principal way in which man may inquire
into the validity of his constructions.
pp. 219-220
Kelly's distinction between the behavior of a person
and his inner construction of experience—his subjective
reality— is reminiscent of Murray's emphasis; indeed, of
Allport's as well.
Note that associated with the rejection of behavior
as a criterion of verification, with the refusal to adopt
a physicalistic methodology, we find a consistent interest
in understanding the person from an "inner" or subjective
standpoint. What is taking shape is a clearer demarcation
of the two paradigms in terms of the conceptual fruit they
bear. If, as Kelly's personality theory suggests, our very
psychological natures reflect the constructs we employ, it
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may be that the behaviorist paradigm gives rise not only
to an impoverished model of personhood, but also to an
impoverished experience of self. Something of the flavor of
this argument is conveyed in the following passage from
one of Kelly's final articles:
A psychology that pins its anticipations on
the repetitions of events it calls "stimuli,"
or on the concatenations of events it calls
"reinforcements," can scarcely hope to survive
as man's audacities multiply. More and more it
will find its accurate predictions confined
to the trivialities of man's least imaginative
moments and to the automatisms of persons given
in to despair. It seems to me that most of what
we know as "modern psychology" is a monotonous
tale told of men left behind by the quickening
tempo of human undertakings. It is such men, and
such men only I suspect, who enact nothing save
what has been reinforced, who are carried on
by the momentum of their biographies rather
than compose their diaries afresh each day, and
who become transfixed by their identities. And
yet I doubt that there are ever men who are
altogether like this. Perhaps it only seems that
way from listening to psychologists.
Kahar,1969; PP. 31-32
Is it too extreme a statement to suggest that, at times,
it only seems that way from being a psychologist?
Mas low. Kelly is not alone among the "second gener-
ation" personality psychologists to escape the behaviorist
paradigm. We may include the obvious example of Abraham
Maslow, psychology's reknown humanist, who lobbied against
the confinements traditional methodology—what has become
traditional methodology--imposes
.
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Mas low saw great danger in psychology's method-
centeredness--or "means centeredness, " as he termed it.
Psychology should develop its methods to suit important
problems, not attack the problems for which its methods
happen to be suited:
Means-centered scientists tend, in spite of
themselves, to fit their problems to their
techniques rather than the contrary
. Their beg-
inning question tends to be Which problems can
I attack with the techniques and equipment I
now possess?rather than what it should more
often be, Which are the most pressing, the most
crucial problems I could spend my time on? How
else explain the fact that most run-of-the-mill
scientists spend their lifetimes in a small
area whose boundaries are defined, not by a
basic question about the world, but by the limit
of a piece of apparatus or of a technique? In
psychology, few people see any humor in the
concept of an "animal psychologist" or a "stat-
istical psychologist," i.e., individuals who
do not mind working with any problem so long as
they can use, respectively, their animals or
their statistics. Ultimately this must remind us
of the famous drunk who looked for his wallet,
not where he had lost it, but under the street
lamp, "because the light is better there," or
of the doctor who gave all his patients fits
because that was the only sickness he knew
how to cure.
1970; p. 13
Maslow saw himself working within and prosyletizing
for a philosophy of science distinctly different from
that characteristic of the psychology of his day:
We must help the "scientific" psychologists
to realize that they are working on the basis
of a philosophy of science, not the philo-
sophy of science, and that any philosophy of
science which serves primarily an excluding
function is a set of blinders, a handicap
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rather than a help. All the world, all of exper-
ience must be open to study. Nothing
, not even
the "personal" problems, need be closed off fromhuman investigation. Otherwise we will force
ourselves into the idiotic position that some
labor unions have frozen themselves into; where
only carpenters may touch wood, and carpenters
may touch only wood, not to mention that if
carpenters do touch it, it is ipso facto wood,
honorary wood, so to speak. New materials and
new methods must then be annoying and even threat-
ening, catastrophes rather than opportunities.
I remind you also of the primitive tribes who
must place everyone in the kinship system. If a
newcomer shows up who cannot be placed, there
is no way to solve the problem but to kill him.
1968a; p. 218
These passages suggest, I think accurately, that
Maslow's view of the process of normal science is close
to Kuhn's: a dominent paradigm establishes a reign of
puzzle solving, where what constitutes a valid puzzle is
predetermined,- Mas low was keenly aware that the present
methodological prejudices exclude important questions,
exclude them by pronouncing them unsolvable, unposable,
or unscientific. As does Kuhn, Maslow notes (Maddi and
Costa, 1972) the process whereby new psychologists are
socialized into the presuppositions of the current para-
digm:
Most graduate training. , . turns away from
(topics like love, hate, hope, fear). They
are called fuzzy, unscientific, tenderminded,
mystical. What is offered instead? Dry bones.
Techniques. Precision. Huge mountains of itty-
bitty facts, having little to do with the
interests that brought the student into psych-
ology. Even worse, they try, most often success-
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fully, to make the student ashamed of his int-
erests as if they were somehow unscientific. And
so often the spark is lost, the fine impulses ofyouth are lost and they settle down to being
members of the guild, with all its prejudices,
its orthodoxies.
P. 37
A large part of the deadening orthodoxy concerns the
same physicalistic conception of science and technique that
we have counted as fundamental to today's paradigm and which
has been rejected by the critiques of Allport, Murray and
Kelly. Maslow (1970) states:
Inevitable stress on elegance, polish
,
technique, and apparatus has as a frequent
consequence a playing down of meaningfulness
,
vitality, and significance of the problem and
of creativeness in general
. Almost any candidate
for the Ph.D. in psychology will understand
what this means in practice. A methodologically
satisfactory experiment, whether trivial or
not, is rarely criticized. A bold, ground-
breaking problem, because it may be a "failure,"
is too often criticized to death before it is
ever begun. Indeed criticism in the scientific
literature seems largely to mean only criticism
of method, technique, logic, etc. I do not
recall seeing, in the literature with which I
am familiar, any paper that criticized another
paper for being unimportant, trivial, or
inconsequential.
pp. 11-12
Maslow attempted to forge a philosophy of science
for psychology that was suited to the original concerns
of personality psychology, namely the understanding of
personhood. He explicitly saw himself establishing a new
way, or Third Force, in psychology:
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In the thirties I became interested in cer-
tain psychological problems, and found that they
could not be answered or managed well by the
classical scientific structure of the time (the
behavioristic, positivistic
, "scientific, " value-
free
,
mechanomorphic psychology). I was raising
legitimate questions and had to invent another
approach to psychological problems in order to
deal with them. This approach slowly became a
general philosophy of psychology, of science in
general, of religion, work, management, and
now biology. As a matter of fact, it became
a Weltanschauung.
1971; P. 3
Central to Maslow's new psychology were elements
already existent in the work of Allport and Murray: a res-
pect for the reality of inner experience—that is to say,
subjective experience— and a reliance upon investigative
procedures that enable researchers to encounter that inner
experience. In Maslow's case, the unstructured interview
figured prominently. A sense of how Maslow proceeded is
suggested by his (1968b) remarks concerning his research
on human sexuality, for which he interviewed women:
But women are really kind of perpetual
miracles. They are like flowers, even old
ladies. Every person is a mystery to me,
but women are more mysterious to me than men.
So any woman is a fascinating mystery to
question for endless hours.
I interviewed 120 women with a new form of
interview. No notes; we just talked along
until I got some feeling for the personality,
then put sex against the background,
P. 5^
Maslow's depiction of self-actualization is based not
only upon the lives of historical persons (e.g., Lincoln),
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but also upon some casual, one must suppose, or at least
informal and indirect interviews of persons Mas low knew
and admired. It is noteworthy to add that Mas low's (1970)
discussion of self-actualizers provokes more lively and
insightful discussion in undergraduate personality classes
than any piece of traditionally- inspired personality re-
search I am aware of.**
In addition to departing from the methodological
prescriptions so central to the behaviorist paradigm of
contemporary psychology, Mas low wasted little time con-
cerning himself with the prediction and control of behavior,
another piller of the current paradigm. His view is close
to Kelly's, holding that behavior in and of itself is of
little relevance or importance to the personality psycho-
It should be noted that Maslow certainly did not
champion an unscientific approach to research; rather, he
hoped to broaden psychologists' conception of science. In
his preface to the first edition of Toward a Psychology
of Being , Maslow (1968a) wrote, "It Is clear to me that
scientific methods (broadly conceived) are our only ulti-
mate ways of being sure that we do_ have the truth" (p.viii).
Maslow did not depart from the traditional notion of
research without some doubts: "My study of self-actualizing
persons has worked out very well— to my great relief, I
must confess. It was, after all, a great gamble, doggedly
pursuing an intuitive conviction and, in the process,
defying'some of the basic canons of scientific method
and of philosophical criticism. These were, after all, rules
which I myself had believed and accepted, and I was very
much aware that I was skating on thin ice. Accordingly,
my explorations proceeded against a background of anxiety,
conflict, and self-doubt" (1970; p. xxi )
.
logist; behavior is not the end we seek:
3ehavior.
.
.is means rather than end, i.e.,
it gets things done in this world. It is a
question whether the exclusion of subjective
states as a legitimate object of psychological
study does not, a priori, make difficult or
even impossible the solution of the problem
we are discussing. Ends as I see them are very
frequently subjective experiences of satis-
faction. Without reference to the fact that
most instrumental behaviors have human worth
only because they bring about these subject-
ive end-experiences, the behavior itself often
becomes scientifically senseless. Behaviorism
itself may be understood better if it is seen
as one cultural expression of the general
Puritan striving and achieving point of view
we have already mentioned. This implies that
to its various other failings must now be added
ethnocentrism.
1970; pp. 233-234
Maslow, Kelly, Murray, and Allport represent a
personological tradition in personality psychology—what
can be defended as the original paradigm of the field,
the paradigm that defined the subject matter in the first
place. Their lives and work suggest that independence
from the paradigms of psychology external to personality
is most easily accomplished by avoiding the socialization
of a standard psychology education, although independence
is certainly possible even for those traditionally educ-
ated. In fact, the death of the personological paradigm
Maslow' s (1968b) initial reaction to Watsonian
behaviorism reads like Skinner's: "Life didn't really
start for me until I got married and went to Wisconsin.
I had discovered J .3 . Watson and I was sold on Behavior-
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can be directly related to the socialization up-and-
coming members of the field receive, for it is typically
true that one is now socialized as a psychologist first,
before one specializes in personality.
But here I am getting ahead of my argument. Before
discussing how the personological tradition was eradic-
ated from academic psychology, we had best summarize
the distinguishing features of that tradition.
The theories of these four men differ significantly,
but they share some presuppositions in common which con-
trast sharply with those characteristic of American aca-
demic psychology today. As discussed, they explicitly
challenged the methodology reigning in the rest of psych-
ology. Each of these theorists (and the list is not meant
ism. It was an explosion of excitement for me. Bertha came
to pick me up and I was dancing down Fifth Avenue with
exuberance; I embarrassed her, but I was so excited about
Watson's program. It was beautiful" (p. 37).
What brought Mas low to renounce behaviorism were
further reading and increased life experience. He attrib-
uted his conversion to reading Freud, gestalt psychology,
organismic psychology, 3ertalanffy, Whitehead, and
Bergson, and to studying the Rorschach Test. Beyond those
intellectual influences were some more personal obser-
vations : "Then when my baby was born that was the thunder-
clap that settled things. I looked at this tiny, mysterious
thing and felt so stupid. I was stunned by the mystery
and by the sense of not really being in control, I felt
small and weak and feeble before all this, I'd say that
anyone who had a baby couldn't be a behaviorist" (p. 56).
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to be exhaustive) defined himself apart from the main- I
stream. The tradition of personality theorists had alwavsJ
been to play a maverick role, to represent a different
way of studying human nature.
The personological personality psychologists were
united in a common definition of their subject matter:
the understanding of personhood, which chiefly was under-
stood to refer to the elements of personality and their
organization and development. The kinds of questions they
addressed themselves to involved human nature and the
conditions of the good life. While they did not nec-
essarily attempt directly to answers these questions,
their sense of mission, their understanding of why the study
of personality was important, ultimately had to do with
human existence on this planet.
The personalistic personality psychologists were
j
theory-minded, while the behaviorist personality psycho-
logists today, by contrast, are study-minded, or hypothe-
sis-minded. This difference underscores the former's
interest in the organization of the elements of person-
ality and the latter's desire to isolate personality var-
iables that enable prediction and control equations.
The former viewed behavior as a peripheral issue,
as the tip of the personality iceberg, as it were; the
latter view behavior as the royal road to verification.
The former tend to be relatively open-minded and
creative in employing techniques and procedures, willing
to allow the questions they asked and their openness to
the richness of personhood to guide their experiment-
ation with procedures. Though certainly many adherents
of the behavior ist paradigm have been as creative and
open-minded in their individual researches, the behavior-
ist personality psychologists as a group have followed a
more inflexible, a priori formula of scientific pro-
cedure
.
The personalistic personality psychologist's goal
was the understanding of personhood. Again and again we
find that word, understanding. It is a word that has in
some respects gone out of fashion with the ascendance of
the behaviorist paradigm.
Understanding has given way to the criterion of
prediction. Indeed, the nature of scientific explanation
itself, for today's paradigm, is intimately bound up
with prediction. Let us specifically raise the question,
What constitutes a scientific explanation?, for the
answer varies from one paradigm to the other, and the
issue is crucial for understanding how the very nature
of "being scientific" changes when a paradigm changes.
The nature of scientific explanation associated
with Hempel is expounded by Dray (1964), a philo-
8^
sopher of history:
Now scientific explanations themselves
may be given at various levels of sophist-
ication. It seems generally to be agreed,
however, that insofar as they explain
particular occurrences .they have one crucial
feature in common: they render predictable
what is explained by subsuming it under
universal empirical laws. In ideal cases,
such subsumption exhibits a deductive
pattern: a statement asserting the occurence
of what is to be explained is shown to be
logically deducible from statements setting
forth certain antecedent conditions, together
with certain empirically verified general
laws
.
P. 5
This formulation will be recognized as an ideal held out
to students in their socialization as psychologists. It
is familiar. What might be overlooked is the qualification,
"that insofar as they explain particular occurrences! " it
seems to me that in employing this philosophy of science
we have forced ourselves to transform psychology into
a science dealing with particular occurrences, rather
than with personhood which is not especially particular.
The personality variables of today's research may be
seen as our manufacture of personality particles.
But let us focus on the relationship between this
formulation of scientific explanation and the role of
prediction. The philosopher of social science, Rudner
(1966), sheds light on the issue:
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The formal structure of a scientific
explanation of some specific event has threeparts: first, a statement E describing some
event to be explained; second, a set of state-
ments Ci to Cn describing specific relevant
circumstances that are antecedent to, o^
otherwise causally correlated with, the eventdescribed by E; third, a set of lawlike state-
ments Lj_ to Ln , universal generalizations
whose import is roughly, 'Whenever events of
the kind described by Ci to Cn take place, then
an event described by E takes place.'
In order for these three sets of statements
actually to constitute an explanation of the
event, they must fulfill at least two con-
ditions: first, the E statement must be deduc-
ible from the C and L statements together, but
not from either set alone, and second, the C
and L statements must be true.
p. 60
Rudner goes on to make explicit that this view of scient-
ific explanation is closely bound up with the capacity
to make predictions; indeed:
It follows from these considerations that
we have an explanati on for an event i f , and
only if Tfrom a different temporal vantage
point) we could have predicted it
.
p. 60
This view of scientific explanation is that of the
behaviorist paradigm. It goes to the heart of the para-
digm's method
, where method is understood not as tech-
niques and procedures but rather as the field's logic
of justification, "the rationale on which it bases its
acceptance or rejection of hypotheses or theories."
Research today aims at the prediction and control of
behavior because the capacity to predict is understood
to be synonymous with an adequate scientific explanation.
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The personalistic paradigm, in contrast, presupposes
a different conception of scientific explanation. I can-
not formulate a statement of the personalistic conception
as well-focussed and polished as those of Dray and Rudner,
and it may be that this alternative conception was, even
for them, the personalistic personality psychologists,
not always explicitly drawn. But time and time again we
find them speaking of understanding, and speaking of it
in contexts that clearly differentiate understanding from
prediction and control.
Consider Rogers's (1961) statement:
In approaching the complex phenomena of
therapy with the logic and methods of science,
the aim is to work toward an understanding
of the phenomenon. In science this means an
objective knowledge of events and of functional
relationships between events. Science may also
give the possibility of increased prediction of
and control over these events, but this is
not a necessary outcome of scientific
endeavor.
pp. 205-206
The conception of scientific explanation embodied in the
personalistic tradition results in different kinds of
expectations concerning a satisfactory scientific account
of personality. Personalistic psychologists expected the
scientific process to end in important understandings,
not replicable predictions.
The complacent certainty with which these older
theorists are today condemned as insufficiently scientif-
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ic derives from the position associated with Hempel; why
listen to Hernpel? Even within the field of philosophy
of science these issues are debated,
Peter Winch, as early as 1958 in The Idea of a Social
Science and i ts Relation to Phil osophy identifies the very
issue of meaningfulness
, virtually synonymous with the
understanding sought by the personalistic psychologists,
as the reason why the physicalistic conception of science
is inappropriate for social science phenomena. A different
method, he makes clear, is necessary:
What in fact one is showing, however, is that
the central concepts which belong to our
understanding of social life are incompatible
with concepts central to the activity of sci-
entific prediction. When we speak of the pos-
sibility of scientific prediction of social
developments of this sort, we literally do
not understand what we are saying. We cannot
understand it because it has no sense,
p. 9^
Winch's point comes to the heart of the matter: the desire
for understanding in the sense of a subjective satisfact-
ion is not what one gets from the method practiced by
psychologists today; indeed, the method practiced today
makes demands that legislate against that very sort of
understanding.
Closer to the position of the personalistic psych-
ologists is the verstehen idea of validation. Scientific
activity can be envisioned in which the empathic under-
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standing of the scientist is counted as evidence that is
validating, in the same sense that empirical predictions
are counted validational now.
I
I
t
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CHAPTER IV
PARADIGM CHANGE IN PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY: WAR OF THE
WORLD VIEWS
The previous chapter argued for the recognition of
a paradigm in personality psychology predating today's,
a personalistic paradigm dedicated to the theoretical
understanding of personhood, a paradigm founded upon a
philosophy of science conducive to such an understanding.
Something happened, though. Personalistic personality
psychologists no longer constitute the heart of academic
personality psychology. Their names almost never appear-
in the references of the leading research journals.
Indicative of the changes that have taken place are the
complaints expressed by Carlson's (1971) article, whose
title itself is revealing, 'Where is the Person in
Personality Research?".
Carlson, reviewing all the articles appearing in the
Journal of Personality and the Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology in 1968 (226 substantive articles) notes:
Obviously, no single scientist, no single
study, no single research tradition can pos-
sibly deal "scientifically'' with anything so
complex as a whcle person. But the attempt
can be made collectively and cumulatively.
The present impoverishment of personality
research is distressing because it suggests
that the goal of studying whole persons has
been abandoned.
p. 207
Among the factors distressing to Carlson are many
that follow logically and intelligibly from the presup-
positions of the behavior ist personality paradigm. First,
she points out (p. 205) that "experimental methods pre-
dominate in current research, with over half of the pub-
lished studies employing manipulative procedures." Most
of the remaining designs are correlational. These kinds
of research are typically of the physicalistic, quant-
ified variety in which human data are briefly assessed--
or assayed in the sense spoken of earlier--then simultan-
eously converted into numbers which, once translated
onto IBM cards, are fed into computers for analysis.
As anyone who has done a great amount of this kind
of research will testify, more time is usually spent,
more manipulations made, more concentration on the
researcher's part expended, after the data have been col-
lected and quantified. For, once the data have been
converted into numbers, the experimenter essentially
begins to play mathematical games, all perfectly legiti-
mate in terms of rules applying to the manipulations of
figures. For the rules of numbers are clear enough, and
one can sometimes argue a case with a significant chi-
square when a t-test of the same data fails to pan out.
The weakest link in much quantitative research is the
translation of human qualities into integral categories.
How angry is 7 on a ten-point anger scale?
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But once the researcher has his 7, the rest is
smooth sailing. And, after all, "the light is better
there."
Carlson does not mention finding case studies. She
also laments the discovery that most studies elicit
hardly any information about their subjects:
Extremes of a "comprehensiveness" dim-
ension are represented by studies in which
subjects left no trace of their personal
participation, merely contributing isolated
bits of behavior to a data pool, and a few in
which subjects provided exhaustuve data on abattery of tests and biographical inventories.
However, the typical study represented an
individual in terms of his ex (sometimes),
treatment condition, performance scores, and
ratings of partner or experimenter in post-
test inquiry. Although the literature as a
whole has elicited a wide range of potentially
important information about persons, no
single investigation either noted or utilized
much information about any individual subject.
Thus the task performances of subjects in
current research remain uninterpretable as
personality data in the absense of anchoring
information.
p. 206
What Carlson is noting here is the effect of the para-
digm change, which has converted the focus of personal-
ity research from the understanding of the person as a
whole to the attempt to predict and control on the basis
of hypothetical personality variables. The studies she
reviewed do not need much information about each subject;
they need, essentially, an assay of the hypothetical
variable and something to predict on the basis of it
(performance ratings).
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A related observation by Carlson concerns how little
time is actually spent with individual subjects:
The time span of contemporary inquiry is
short. The vast majority of published work
was based upon a single session; less than
one fifth of reported studies involved more
than a two-week period, and rarer still were
the few studies involving follow-up over sig-
nificant periods of time.
p. 206
The presupposition that natural science techniques can
be employed profitably on human subjects has already
been noted. How long does it take to determine a solution's
temperature? How time consuming is the assessment of a
mineral's specific gravity?
Carlson also notes that no attention is paid to
the organization of personality or to changes occur-
ring over time :
We cannot study the organization of per-
sonality because we know at most only one or
two "facts" about any subject. We cannot
study the stability of personality nor its
development over epochs of life, because we
see our subjects for an hour.
P. 207
Of course we cannot I These are not especially import-
ant (visible) problems in terms of the current paradigm's
world view. In fact, Carlson's complaint is only a
complaint from the point of view of the personalistic
paradigm. It comes as no surprise to read that Carlson
quotes Maddi's (1968) definition of the field of person-
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ality, for Maddi, co-author of Hu^ij^i^
Allport, Maslow. and Murray, was himself a student of
both Allport and Murray who, indeed, is one of very few
personality psychologists still to employ the term
personologist . 13
Indeed, Carlson quotes Murray himself:
Over 30 years ago, Murray (1938) noted that
The reason why the results of so many
researches in personality have been misleading
or trivial is that experimenters have failed toobtain enough pertinent information about their
subjects. Lacking these facts, accurate general-izations are impossible, (p.ix)." This comment
could stand as a summary of current work--with
the important amendment that the accumulation
of more "facts" (including much unassimilateddata collected through Explorations in Per-
sonality ) has not provided, nor is likely toprovide, the basic generalizations needed in thisfield.
P. 213
J Maddi's definition: "The personologist is interested
in universals
. .
.
in the commonalities ajnong people (as well
as ) . .
.
in the attempt to ident ify and classify differences
among people ... The personologistTs rather" unusual in not
restricting himself to behavior easily traceable to social
and biological pressures of the moment ... Of all the social
and biological scientists, then, the persono logist believes
most deeply in the complexity and individuality of life
. .
,
his emphasis (is) upon character istics ... that show contin-
uity in time... that seem to have psychological importance
. .
.
that have some ready reTationship to the major goals
and directions of the person's life... The personologist
is interested in all rather than only some of the psycho-
logical behaviors of the person. .. Finally, personologists .. ,
are primarily interested in the adult human being... the
fruit of development— a congealed personality that exerts
a Dervasive influence on present and future behavior"
(1968? pp. 6-9).
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Carlson complains that "problems are posed by current
research conventions" (p. 210), but the problems she des- I
cribes are the natural expression in research of the pre-
suppositions of today's behaviorist personality para-
digm. Her complaint stands as evidence that things have
changed in personality psychology. Prom the days of the
lengthy case study (White's Lives in Progress
. Murray's
Explorations in Personal]^, Allport's Letters from Jenny)
we now find ourselves in the midst of a literature on the
basis of which one can ask, where is the person in person-
ality research? Something happened: a paradigm change.
Kuhn (1970a) has adopted an evolutionary metaphor
for this process of paradigm change, a metaphor seemingly
justified by the role he accords anomaly in the cycle of
a science's development. For an anomaly, however unintended,
is a result of the paradigm it ultimately brings down.
Kuhn equates a paradigm with a way of construing the world,
and his model of a science's development could be phrased
as follows: a new paradigm realizes a new world, one with
a certain amount of unexplored promise; normal science is
the exploration of that world. A "good" paradigm is a
reality that for the most part works : allowing the formul-
ation of solvable problems. But no paradigm will fit
perfectly, and eventually a paradigm will come up against
its own limits. At this point the community of scholars
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confronts anomaly. Eventually a new way of realizing the
world will be proposed that will solve the problem--or
dissolve the impasse—and the crisis will subside and
the field will have adapted.
3ut did the paradigm revolution in personality
psychology occur because the personalistic paradigm
foundered on its own anomaly? Although Kuhn's depict-
ion of normal revolutionary science would lead us to sus-
pect so, I doubt that such is the case. Is there any
evidence of a crisis in the original paradigm? Were there
unsolvable problems which the adoption of the behaviorist
personality paradigm dissolved? I think not.
We have earlier discussed the distortion of history
in which a field under the influence of a new paradigm
indulges, so to consider whether the personalistic
paradigm ended in crisis we must especially be on guard
against a false sense of history.
Specifically, we can expect researchers today to
take for granted the speedy downfall into crisis and
anomaly of the personalistic paradigm's research, where
that impression derives from the method of empirical
prediction and control. What, after all, did Explorations
in Personality prove? What was established by Letters
From Jenny? The dogma is that the formulations of the
personality theorists never did—nor could--stand up to
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the criterion of empirical testing.
But such an application of that criterion is, as I
have suggested, anachronistic. We project backwards the
criterion we currently employ, and erase the memory that
different criteria of science were in vogue then. What
needs to be demonstrated is the presence of crisis in the
personalistic paradigm in its own terms . Was there inter-
nal recognition of crisis and anomaly?
There is evidence to suggest no such crisis. At their
deaths neither Allport, Maslow, nor Kelly had recanted.
On the contrary. Murray, in retirement, is at work on
a psychological biography of Melville which, one presumes,
suggests a continuing interest in the person as a whole,
as well as in the biography as the proper unit of
analysis
.
But such evidence of continued allegiance to an old
paradigm constitutes only a weak case. Kuhn himself has
suggested that even during normal revolutionary change
there will be old men who never make the transition to the
new paradigm.
Yet other evidence that the personalistic paradigm
did not fail in its own terms is available. One line of
evidence is speculative but fascinating. During World
War II Murray was placed in charge of the selection of
candidates for the Office of Strategic Servies, the OSS,
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forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency. The asses-
sment procedures developed by Lt. Colonel Murray and his
staff, recounted in Assessment of Ifen . published in 1948, I
are not far different from those employed in the Explorat-
ions study, at least in terms of format; for example,
in both subjects are placed unwittingly in frustrating
situations to determine their reactions under stress.
That Murray should have served as the first chief
psychologist for what has become the C.I. A. is curious,
and one wonders whether his approach has met with more
success there than it has in academic psychology. I believe
there are indications that Murray's personalistic approach
exerts a continuing impact today, however banished it
may now be from universities.
What makes me think so is the text of the C.I. A.
report to President Nixon describing Daniel Ellsburg,
leaked to the press during the aftermath of the Watergate
Scandal. The terms of this psychological description are
hardly those of the quantified form typical of today's
research and conceptualizations. Instead are suggested
the old Murray needs and press, the complexes and
dynamic interactions :
This indirect personality assessment is
based primarily on background material and
current impressions derived from press re-
ports, including newspaper and magazine
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selected ^Ll^^i™ interviews. m addition,
Invpot?!^
6 DePartmen^ and Federal Bureau of
thl dUf £ memoranda have been reviewed. As
So dW+ ? ? - S f™Zmen^Y and there has been
this iSS?
cl
i
nical valuation of the subject,
hiihlv
n
2j£!?? a?sessment should be considered
Tht? la ? ln no definitive.
MV^r! nothing to suggest in the material
£StS SwJ su - Je^ suffers from a seri™s
2nd St i? ?n erK ln -!?e SenSe ° f beinS P^chotica out of touch with reality. There are sug-gestions, however, that some of his long-stand-ing personality needs were intensified by psych-
thlS III
Pressures of the mid-life period and thatis may have contributed significantly to his
recent actions.
An extremely intelligent and talented indiv-idual, subject apparently early made his bril-liance evident. It seems likely that there were
substantial pressures to succeed and that sub-ject early had instilled in him expectations of
success, that he absorbed the impression that he
was special and destined for greatness. And indeedhe did attain considerable academic success and
seemed slated for a brilliant career.
There has been a notable zealous intensity
about the subject throughout his career. Appar-
ently finding it difficult to tolerate ambig-
uity and ambivalence, he was either strongly for
something or strongly against it. There were
suggestions of problems in achieving full success,
for although his ideas glittered, he had trouble
committing himself in writing.
He had a knack for drawing attention to him-
self and at early ages had obtained positions of
considerable distinction, usually attaching him-
self as a "bright young man " to an older and
experienced man of considerable stature who was
attracted by his brilliance and flair.
3ut one can only sustain the role of "bright
young man" so long. Most men between the ages of
35 and 4-5 go through a period of reevaluation.
Realizing that youth is at an end, that many of
their golden dreams cannot be achieved, many men
transiently drift into despair at this time.
In an attempt to escape from these feelings
of despair and to regain a sense of competence
and mastery, there is an increased thrust towards
new activity at this time. Thus this is a time
of career changes, of extramarital affairs and
divorce
.
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It is a time when many men come to doubt
their earlier commitments and are impelled to
strike out in new directions.
For the individual who is particularly
driven towards the heights of success and pro-
minence, this mid-life period may be a partic-
ularly difficult time. The evidence reviewed
suggests that this was so for Sllsberg, a man
whose career had taken off like a rocket, but
who found himself at mid-life not nearly having
achieved the prominence and success he expected
and desired.
Thus it may well have been an intensified need
to achieve significance that impelled him to
release the Pentagon papers.
There is no suggestion that subject thought
anything treasonous in his act. Rather, he seemed
to be responding to what he deemed a higher order
of patriotism. His exclusion of the three volumes
of the papers concerned with the secret negot-
iations would support this.
Many of the subject's own words would con-
firm the impression that he saw himself as hav-
ing a special mission, and indeed as bearing a
special responsibility. On several occasions he
castigated himself for not releasing the papers
earlier, observing that since he first brought
them to the attention of the (Senate) Foreign
Relations Committee, there had been "two invas-
ions," more than 9,000 American lives lost, and
hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese deaths.
He also on several occasions had suggested
quite strongly that his actions will not only
alter the shape of the Vietnam war, but will
materially influence the conduct of our foreign
policy and the relationship between the people and
the government.
Ellsberg's reactions since emerging from sec-
lusion have been illustrative. Initially there was
jubilation, an apparent enjoyment of the lime-
light. This was succeeded by a transient period
wherein there was a sense of quiet satisfaction,
of acceptance of his new-found stature, as if
personally significant actions had accomplished
what he sought to achieve.
3ut then, embittered that Congress and the
press had not wholeheartedly supported him, he
turned against them. This is not surprising,
for there would seem to be an insatiable qual-
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ity to Ellsberg's strong need for success and
recognition, 14
Is it going to too far an extreme to claim to detect
within this report a trace of Murray's conception of per-
sonality as •a full Congress of orators'' complete with
"Machiavels" and "Promethean revolutionists"? Certainly
one can with relative ease translate the terms of this
description into those of Murray's need system. Consider,
for example, his (1938) break-down of the need for super -
iority into need for achievement— "wil 1 to power over
things, people, and ideas"—and the need for recognition^
"efforts to gain approval and high social status" (p. 80),
The conceptualization of a life here, at very least,
falls clearly within the personalistic tradition: it is
dynamic, holistic, developmental, and suggestive of an
inner experience and deep subjectivity, all of which are
atypical of today's behavior ist formulations of person-
ality.
The point of this extended line of speculation is
to suggest that if personalistic psychology is still
practiced, albeit outside academia, the paradigm itself
is perforce viable.
The practice of psychotherapy similarly supports the
viability of the personalistic paradigm. The adherence
^"Test of Study on Ellsberg, " New York Times , 3 Aug'
ust 1973, P. 10.
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after all these years of practitioners to holistic and
dynamic formulations of personhood suggests that such
formulations promote insight and understanding. Terms and
concepts that have vanished from today's research—the
entire process of unconscious dynamics—still offer ill-
umination in contexts outside academic research depart-
ments. 1^
Additional support is found in the flourishing of
humanistic education centers within the past 10 or 15
years. Frequently influenced by Erikson, Mas low and
Rogers, these programs focus upon understanding and pro-
moting the richness of inner experience. Such programs
typically earn their share of condescension or scorn from
academic psychologists, who find the lack of rigorous,
quantitative methods objectionable. But the viewpoint
represented by such schools of education—of viewing the
person as the embodiment of a rich subjectivity— seems
sufficiently rewarding in its own terms to keep these
programs alive.
In a larger sense, the realm of popular psychology
—
^Studies citing the inefficacy of psychotherapy
typically do so by employing criteria seemingly more a
reflection of the behaviorist paradigm than of the per-
sonalistic paradigm. Such studies do not, to my knowledge,
assess clinicians* insights and understandings as a
function of theoretical persuasions. Rather, such criti-
ques generally attempt to concoct a quantified indicator
of successful-functioning behaviors.
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of bookstore Psychology-suggest, the appeal of the per-
sonalistic world view. I cannot summarize the gospel
according to the popular press, and I am aware that in
these writings the reader is sometimes invited to con-
strue himself in metaphors every bit as mechanical and
unpoetic as those academic psychologists trade in, but
such books as Sheehy's Passages address themselves to the
concerns of persons confused about, or interested in, what
it means to be a person.
This is to say, perhaps, only that the puzzles the
old paradigm posed for itself are certainly posable still.
And to the extent that one can accept a certain illumination
of thought as a criterion of verification and validity,
the insights provided by some of these writers--and Maslow
and Rogers both have the readership to be included here
—
suggests that such puzzles are also solvable.
If the personalis^ ic personality paradigm did not
falter because of an autochthonous crisis, how is it that
the behaviorist personality paradigm replaced it? The
answer on one level is to be sought in transformations
taking place within psychology as a whole. The 1920 's were
not an especially propitious time for the seeds of ail
independent paradigm to sprout. The revolution in per-
sonality psychology was merely one aspect of the great
sweep of behaviorism. Being trained within the same instit-
utions, a new generation of personality psychologists were
socialized into the presuppositions of the behaviorist
paradigm.
Even if the new wave of personality psychologists
refused to accept the reductionist notion of an empty
organism, and even if they insisted upon postulating
"inner" personality variables, they accepted the formu-
lations of science itself which behaviorism brought
upon us.
What I am suggesting is an invisible revolution,
perhaps even a revolution from outside. 3y "invisible"
I refer to a quite unknowing absorption of presuppositions.
One example has already been given, that of the alteration
of psychology's definition into the science of behavior.
For reasons having nothing to do with the success
or failure of the new science of personality to solve its
paradigm puzzles, I contend, the science of psychology
during the 1920* s and 1930' s became increasingly the
property of behaviorism; and the psychologists who special-
ized in personality, we may assume, were socialized into
the same conception of science as were the psychologists
who went on to study reinforcement schedules or to look
for engrams.
In addition to being invisible, this revolution may
be perceived as imposed from the outside—depending upon
one's willingness to view the personalistic personality
psychologists as actually standing apart from the rest
of psychology as a community of scholars, certainly a
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debatable point. If the point is granted, one could speak
not of revolution of paradigms, but rather of conquest.
Kuhn's evolutionary metaphor would seem in good part
based upon the apparently dialectical process of a field
responding to the crises its own progress generates. If
the revolution be "imported," though, that dialectical
process might become entirely irrelevant to the establish-
ment of the resulting paradigm, raising questions for any
<L Pr iori assertions about that new paradigm's evolutionary
or adaptive superiority.
The suggestion that the revolution of paradigms in
personality constitutes an "abnormal" scientific revol-
ution, however intriguing, rests upon a moot point— is
personality psychology outside the community of general
psychology—and will not be developed beyond noting an
especial danger of "imported" revolution. That is, an imposed
revolution could easily throw a field into maladaptive
relationship with its subject matter. That this might be
the case in personality psychology has already been sug-
gested by the discussion of the ' Mischel controversy ' --
recall the doubt cast upon the very reality of person-
ality variables that resulted from the difficulty of
reconciling them with the demands of a method based upon
the prediction of behavior.
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Personality psychology could, then, be depicted as a
servant to two masters. On one hand are the •'demands" of
the subject matter, the profound complexity and depth of
personhood. On the other hand are the presuppositions
concerning method and science which severely restrict
what can be recognized as verifiable or real. One could
indeed argue that we have been forced to abandon those
qualities of the subject matter not treatable by our
method, and thus explain the superficiality of both cur-
rent research and the diminished model of personhood it
presupposes
.
But as we shall see in the next chapter, the change
of paradigm in personality psychology can be understood in
quite different terms, terms that suggest that the current
paradigm is not so entirely inappropriate to its subject
matter, human personality today. Let me conclude this
chapter by noting that Kuhn's formulations, which have
enabled us to understand the current state of personality
psychology, are suggestive in other ways as well. They
offer a perspective for understanding the implications
for change and are suggestive in diagnosing our present
predicament as scientists and as persons. We shall turn now
to a consideration of what might be done to bring per-
sonality psychology into better days.
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CHAPTER V
PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE MODERN WORLD:
IMPLICATIONS FOR CHANGE
Having followed the argument this far, some readers
might question the necessity of employing Kuhn's model
of paradigm revolution, for criticisms of psychology
similar to those I am offering have been made on the
basis of psychology's philosophical presuppositions alone.
Many good critiques have laid the blame, as it were, upon
positivism, operationalism, and realism. Consider this
passage from Rychlak (1968) for example:
Idealism in the form stated at the outset
of this section is, if not unheard of, then
surely avoided in American psychology. This is
because psychology has been dominated by the
language of realism in academic circles since
the days of John B. Watson (1913). Indeed, his
revolt against introspectionism was in a sense
a reaction of realism (out there, in the hard
reality) to the prevailing idealism (in here,
the mind's eye). Over succeeding generations
American psychological journal articles have
been primarily occupied with problems of how
best to map reality "out there." Usually framed
in terms of lawfulness, we have shown great con-
cern with measurements ("Let's make our maps
highly precise"), operational definitions ("Let's
get as close to reality as we can"), and re-
ductionism ("Let's start with simple maps and
then work our way up"). Our "toughmindedness"
is tied to our realism.
pp. 19-20
The hidden presuppositions that structure how we as
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scientists perceive and research our subject matter can be
discussed without employing Kuhn's specific formulation of
paradigm. But Kuhn's model has implications that are con-
venient and insightful, and it seems to me a greater clarity
concerning psychology's present situation is enabled by
Kuhn's analytical system.
For the problem of transforming personality psychology,
Kuhn provides an understanding of the process -of change.
Once we identify the problem as one of maladaptive or, at
least, limiting paradigm, we are led to inquire how a
field might alter its paradigm.
To those psychologists who recognize the superfic-
iality of today's findings, who admit the triviality of
the great bulk of current research, but who feel the sol-
ution lies in "better research"—curvilinear models instead
of linear, larger or repeated sampling of ever-increasing
numbers of variables instead of simple, before-and-after
,
two variable designs— Kuhn's position suggests a disappoint-
ing picture. A science's paradigm is not capable of cor-
rection by the empirical research it gives rise to. As
Kuhn states, "Paradigms are not corrigible by normal
science at all" (1970a; p. 122).
A paradigm whose presuppositions make the realities
of mental life invisible can hardly illuminate mental
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life, however refined its procedures. Earlier we discussed
paradigms by developing the hypothetical example of the
extreme humanist and radical behaviorist who both observe
the ••same" baby crying. In the case of the radical behav-
iorist perspective-not to be confused with the behaviorist
personality paradigm-it is easy to imagine different
learning theories competing to explain the organism.
Increasingly sophisticated research procedures might sup-
port one over the others of such theories (we are not
saying that theoretical formulations are not corrigible
under normal science), but the behavioral presuppositions
are never transcended. And similarly among competing
humanist theories. Increasing ability to predict and con-
trol the crying behavior will never lead to the perception
of trust and agency. Increasing sensitivity to issues of
trust and agency will never lead to the perception of the
lawfulness of operants.
The point is certainly important: a paradigm is
incorrigible in terms of its own research. If the problem
is a matter of the paradigm itself, continuing with normal
research, or perfecting it, is rather pointless. Thus,
the first recommendation to be made on the basis of this
analysis is to discontinue current research practices.
If continuing with our present empirical research
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will not solve the crisis, what will? How can we solve the
paradigm problem? What would be ideal is a restitution of
the paradigm that was pushed aside with the ascent of
behaviorism. This original paradigm was never brought to
full fruition. We might still learn about personality
through direct observations of individuals conceived hol-
istically. The case study method has not yet yielded all
it might toward an understanding of personhood.
But how easily can a paradigm revolution be engin-
eered through the good intentions of psychologists armed
with a vision of a better science of personality? The
picture seems grim. To understand how the next paradigm
revolution might occur, we might look to the past for an
understanding of how the last paradigm revolution
occurred.
How is it that the behaviorist paradigm so thoroughly
captivated the field of psychology? The question is
thorny, and any attempt to answer it to the satisfaction
of all is probably doomed. I should like in this section
to address some issues that seem pertinent to understanding
our acquisition of the behaviorist paradigm, hoping to
shed light on the matter of change today.
The success of the behaviorist paradigm has been
explained in terms of its promise to make psychology a
valid science. Many writers have explained psychology's
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espousal of behaviorism in terms of psychologists' desire
to be as scientific as physicists. "For many years,"
according to Deese (1972), "a large and active group
of psychologists worked hard to make psychology over
in the image of physics" (p. 3). According to Hudson
(1972):
Psychologists have a marginal position in
the academic community, poised near the border-
line between the humane and the scientific
disciplines; we have a farouche professional
past, redolent of mesmerism, even of witch
doctoring; and there still exist widespread
misgivings--both in academic life and in
society at large—about any attempt to
examine the mind's contents. Our response,
professionally, has been to over-reacts to
observe all the outward signs of scientific
respectability, taking as our model, incid-
entally, the Victorian conception of the
physical scientist, a model that physical
scientists have themselves abandoned.
p. 86
The implication that psychologists leapt to behav-
iorism because it assuaged their concern over not being
scientific suggests an incomplete picture, for it under-
plays the extent to which psychologists of the intro-
spectionist school saw themselves in their own terms as
adequately scientific, and, consequently, masks the pres-
ence of a conflict over the very nature of science.
Members of both schools could in good conscience
boast of scientific purity. And it is worthwhile to
point out that if from the behaviorist standpoint the
Ill
introspectionists were not psychologically scientific
, the
introspectionists considered the behavior ists not
scientifically psychological
. Robert Watson (1971),
the historian of psychology, gives this account of
Titchener's view:
He shared Wundt's distaste for the applied
aspects of psychology. 3ehavior is not the
concern of a psychology of consciousness.
If experience is the sole concern of psychology,
then performance (behavior) is irrelevant.
Behavior is worthy of study--as a branch of
biology, not as psychology, Titchener objected
to what he called "the penny-in-the-slot
sort of science," in which consciousness is
said to be inferred, when it was always there
waiting to be interrogated. .. .Behaviorism,
which would see study of behavior as para-
mount, is logically irrelevant to psychology.
p. *K)2
Because the introspectionists could see themselves as
adequately scientific, the conflict between schools was not
so much one between unscientific incumbents and rigorously
scientific hopefuls; rather, the conflict involved two
differing views of science. The behaviorist formulation
won the day, and its succession was couched in the leg-
itimating language of greater scientific purity. But our
understanding of how today's paradigm came to power
will be inadequate if we leave it at the level of the
desire to seem scientific. We must question the specific
appeal of the behaviorist formulation of science over
the pre-existing formulation.
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Kuhn's discussion of the factors enabling scientists
to embrace a new paradigm suggests that appeals to empiri-
cal evidence or to purity of methods do not play deciding
roles, for both old and new paradigms define method and
can present evidence in a way that benefits itself while
damning the other:
When paradigms enter, as they must, into a
debate about paradigm choice, their role is
essentially circular. Each group uses its own
paradigm to argue in that paradigm's defense.
1970a; p. 9^
According to Kuhn, "this issue of paradigm choice can never
be unequivocally settled by logic and experimentation
alone" (p. 9*0 » and even the techniques of pursuasive
argument must be recognized as important factors.
In this light, the behavior ist paradigm's success
was possibly a function of its promis e. It is difficult
exactly to pinpoint the nature of this promise, but some-
thing of what I am getting at is reflected in ivlaslow's
early enthusiasm, previously quoted, which he described
in terms of "an explosion of excitement." Of course, not
everyone upon encountering J.B. Watson's program dances
down Fifth Avenue, but there was something about the
behaviorist world view that clicked, that caught on for
the time and place.
What was it about the behaviorist formulation that
made it so appealing to American psychologists? How can
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we understand the magnetic appeal that enabled the para-
digm so strongly to establish itself that it completely
dominated psychology? Was it Watson's own skill as an
advertiser, or something larger than one man's compelling
writing style?
Rychlak (1968) suggests one line of argument with
his comment
t
At heart it is the image of man which is at
issue in psychology's internal conflict, let
us make no mistake about that. The arguments
all come down to this: How shall we theorize
about the human being?
P. 2
Can we understand the popularity of the behaviorist para-
digm in terms of the suitability of its image of man
for the time and place, American society since the 1920' s?
What is new about behaviorism is not the discovery
per se of laws of learning nor even the application of
such laws in contexts such as behavior modification}
circus trainers and factory owners have successfully
employed them for years. What is new is the model of the
person, the image of man it presents.
Paradigms in psychology do present society with an
image of man, and in order to bake root, the paradigm
I am indebted especially to Professor Howard Gadlin
whose lectures in systematic psychology have suggested the
general outline of this argument.
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must present an image congruent with the needs and demands
of the larger society. Perhaps this is only to say that
the world view of the paradigm must be congruent with
the larger reality manufactured by society, an argument
which requires essentially the integration of the insights
of Berger and Luckmann's (1967) The Social Construction of
Reality with those of Kuhn.
A connection that cannot be ignored, I am suggesting,
exists between the politics of paradigm change in psych-
ology and social forces in society. The case can be made
that in the period of time from, say, World War I to the
present, a shift in the meaning of personhood has been
mandated within American society, and this shift under-
lies the rise of behaviorism.
Stated simply, American society has witnessed a
dwindling of the richness of the inner experience of
selfhood, and this dwindling has been reflected in psych-
ological formulations that have promoted an ever more
shallow and superficial depiction of personhood.
>
If I may intrude upon a field not my own, this change
in the quality of personal life has been suggested directly
and indirectly in modern literature. Vonnegut (1975) is
one writer who claims for his profession a special
sensitivity to such changes:
All artists are specialized cells in a single,
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huge organism, mankind. Those cells have tobehave as they do, just as the cells in oShearts or our fingertips have to behave asthey do.
We here are some of those specialized cells.Our purpose is to make mankind aware of itself,in all its complexity, and to dream its dreams
.we have no choice in the matter.
p. 228
A succinct statement of the condition of man in modern
society is given in Leonard Michaels' s recent review of
Peter Handke* s A Moment of True Feeling , which appeared
in the New York Times 's Book Review recently:
The Austrian, Peter Handke, who writes
poetry, plays and memoirs, is concerned with
a familiar subject—the loss of authenticity
or innocence. For Handke, this loss character-
izes modern life. He thinks we no longer
experience things directly, no longer truly
feel. All our experience is mediated by cult-
ural formulae, established ideas, cliches of
language and manners. Hence, we are alienated
from ourselves and left only with the knowledge
that everything valuable is gone.
July 31, 1977; p. 7
Michaels 's description of this subject as "familiar" would
seem to speak for itself.
The sociologist Max Weber's conception of rational-
ization of society has provided me with a model for under-
standing what societal forces possibly lie behind the rise
of the behaviorist paradigm. Weber, who is especially
esteemed for his sociological analysis of bureaucracies,
saw rationalization as a process accounting for the basic
drift of Western civilization. According to Robert Nisbet
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(1976), Professor in the Humanities at Columbia, Weber's
concept can be summarized as follows:
Basically, rationalization is, in Weber's
sense of the word, the imposition of strict
means-end criteria not only upon thought
itself but upon art, science, culture, govern-
ment, war, even religion. It implies the
exclusion from thought or act of all that is
purely traditional, charismatic, or ritualistic,
all, in short, that is not directly related
to the means necessary to efficient realization
of a given end. Since reason teaches us that
the shortest distance between two points is a
straight line, rationalization is the process
through which we seek, as it were, a straight
line, and, thereby, avoid or exclude all that
is indirect or circuitous. Weber came to believe
that from the late Middle Ages on, more and more
areas of Western Culture, beginning with govern-
ment and finance, had become subject to the
canons of rationalization, thus promoting what
he called, in a phrase borrowed from the poet
Schiller, "the disenchantment of the world."
pp. 111-112
Weber saw in the monopolistic imposition of rational
principles and means-ends relationships in the place of
traditional, sacred, and folk ways a disenchantment, a
loss of magic and poetry. This sense of loss of magic
and poetry captures my own estimation of the changes in
personhood. Rationalization has caught up with selfhood,
and the rise of the behaviorist paradigm is an expression
of it. What has taken place is a disenchantment of
self.
Some of the early personality psychologists per-
ceived in behaviorist psychology the connection with an
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increasingly impoverished societal conception of personhood.
Consider this statement of Allporti
™ti™£e^a^^air t0 blame the Positivistoutlook in psychology and social science forthe present plight of mankind, although many
critics do so. Positivism is more a reflectionthan a cause of the fragmentation of person-
ality in the modern world.
196li p. 552
Henry Murray, in several instances, has shown that
he, too, was onto the scent. In his Explorations in
Personality we find the following included as a footnote
to his discussion of the peripheralists in psychology,
those researchers in quest of data that can be cast in
statistical terms 1
This may be regarded, perhaps, as one of many
manifestations of a general disposition which
is widespread in America, namely, to regard
the peripheral personality—conduct rather than
inner feeling and intention—as of prime import-
ance. Thus, we have a fabrication of a 'pleasing
personality, 1 mail order courses in comport-
ment, courtesy as good business, the best pressed
clothes, the best barber shops, Listerine and
deoderants, the contact man, friendliness without
friendship, the prestige of movie stars and
Big Business, quantity as an index of worth, a
compulsion for fact getting, the statistical
analysis of everything, questionnaires and
behaviorism.
P. 9
This association of behaviorism with Listerine and
deoderants, with contact men and "friendliness without
friendship" so characteristic of sales relationships
(and, too often, of collegial relationships in academic
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departments 1") bespeaks the connection between society and
psychology's change of paradigm.
What I am suggesting is that American society "needed"
or was ready for an image of personhood like that pro-
moted by the behaviorist paradigm; externalistic, super-
ficial, mindless. Let us again attend to Henry Murray (19^0)
on the topic
:
Americans have fashioned a cosmetic culture,
in which a pleasing appearance at quick contacts
is the thing that counts. It pays—so we are told
—
to be washed, shaved, manicured, deodorized,
tailored (cleanliness is next to godliness), and
to smile, smile, smile (agreableness is next to
cleanliness). It is the day of Life
,
Click
,
Look
,
and Peek
, of instantaneous effects, candid photo-
graphy, voyeurism and exhibitionism. A successful
personality can be bought (and paid for). The
camera makes the man. If you want to be President,
'In the fiction of Updike is a passage which, while
making again the point about the change in personhood in
relation to modern life, hits rather close to home:
"I have the impression, at any rate, that he, as is
often the case with scientists and Midwesterners, had no
use for religion, and I saw in him a typical specimen of
the new human species that thrives around scientific
centers, in an environment of discussion groups, ^ outdoor
exercise, and cheerful husbandry. Like those vanished
gentlemen whose sexual energy was exclusively spent in
brothels, these men confine their cleverness to their
work, which, being in one way or another for the govern-
ment, is usually secret. With their sufficient incomes,
large families, Volkswagen buses, hi-fi phonographs,
half-remodelled Victorian homes, and harassed, ironical
wives, they seem to have solved, or dismissed, the para-
dox of being a thinking animal and, devoid of guilt,
apparently participate not in this century but in the
next." -"The Music School," p. 139.
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there are agencies ready to take your picturemilking Bossy and kissing chubby chUdrenTto
ll^t
camPalen and write sure-fire speeches
?5 lun A?lease every°ne (and no one). (What
i; Vl
e
5
ett
^
burg address had been put together
on Broadway?) Our civilization is skin deep, andthe best epidermis triumphs. This is all part andparcel of the race for goods, comfort, and social
recognition. It is the ideology of big business,
now well established in our universities! product-ivity en masse
, the mechanical advance of medioc-
rity. The wheels turn and psychology is caught
upt it takes its place on the assembly line.
Move on there 1 This is no place for rumination*
Get busy with the calculator and hand in your
results i Who is not familiar with this treadmill?
and with the deadening consequences of it? Super-
ficiality is the great sin of American personology.
It suits the tempo of the times j it suits
industry and commerce ; it suits our interest in
appearances j it suits our boyish optimism. And
it suits the good heart of America, its Rotarian
solidarity, its will-to-agree, since it is easier
to agree about the surface than about the depths.
Perhaps there are no depths. Who knows? There are
no depths. Since truth is congenial fiction, and
this fiction is most congenial, this is truth.
It is no mute thing that the inventor of behavior-
ism found his destiny in the advertising business.
P. 175
The behaviorist paradigm is, so to speak, as American as
mass-produced, mass-marketed, artificially flavored apple
pie.
If we accept the argument that paradigms are societally
responsive, what are the implications for paradigm change
today? Can we expect change to come about in response to
cogent criticisms, and continually advance the publication
dates of the argument first made by Allport and Murray,
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then later by Maslow and, more recently still, Carlson?
While the attempt is undoubtedly noble, it is, at the same
time, typically frustrated. The would-be reformer is in
the position of the pawn on the chess board who discovers
that his fate is not, as he thought, in the hands of the
king and queen, but rather in the hand behind the board.
The imagery of the chess board suggests ray position
that the relationship between society and psychology's
paradigm is essentially one-way. As society changes, so
does psychology's paradigm. Can we argue the case for a
two-way relationship, wherein psychology as a field is
depicted as influencing society through the production of
personality models which become increasingly realized in
the actual population? Does the image of man presented by
academic psychology serve as an influence to create such
men in the real world? Has, for example, the thinking of
Skinner influenced the man on the street to regard himself
in Skinnerian terms and possibly become a congeries of
behavior with a reinforcement history?
The question is intriguing. My own answer is a quali-
fied no. I do not believe that present day academic
psychology is in the Mephistophelean business of creating
through influence upon the public the kinds of persons
that society needs. I think not, simply because the vast
majority of our work exists in remotest isolation from the
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everyday awareness of the general public. Most Americans
have not the vaguest idea of what academic psychologists
are up to.
But my
-no" is qualified, for there is one group
extremely prone to such influence, and they, of course,
are psychologists themselves.
Unless he is extremely cynical or capable of depositing
his intellectual schema at the office door when retiring
from his workday, the personality psychologist inevit-
ably employs his constructs for making sense of himself,
his associates close and casual, and his world. How can it
be otherwise? Like every serious scientist, he likes to
believe his constructs are the best available and, so to
speak, the truest. And just as a scientific discipline's
basic reality derives from its paradigm presuppositions, so
might it be argued that the individual's personal reality,
including his inner experience as well as his conception
of the meaning of being alive, similarly reflects the con-
structs available to him.
In the field of personality psychology today there
exists an occupational hazard, and that hazard concerns
the depth and quality of one's personal experience. Today's
model of the person, that consortium of dispositions,
either consistent or situationally specific, that soulless
intersection of rating dimensions, that predictable, deter-
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mined machine, threatens to overtake and become us. We
run a risk of believing ourselves the experiential zom-
bies, the emotionally shallow creatures that march over
the statistics of our journals. We run a risk to the extent
that we strive in our own lives to fit our personalities
into the molds required to maintain our allegiance to
our own modern paradigm.
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